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[Excerpt] Collective bargaining systems, frameworks and practices in the EU have come under some 
pressure in recent years. Against a steady, long-term decline in the numbers of companies and workers 
covered by a collective agreement, employer organisations and some politicians and experts argue that 
the collective bargaining system is too static and inflexible. They insist that companies need more room 
for manoeuvre to adapt, specify and also deviate from higher-level agreements to respond better to 
accelerated global competition. This pressure has increased since the 2008 crisis, when a number of EU 
Member States, in response to high unemployment rates, implemented labour reforms aimed at 
increasing competitiveness, productivity and job creation. 
Against this background, this study aims: 
• first, to map developments in all major aspects of collective bargaining (apart from pay 
and working time, which have been analysed separately by Eurofound) over the past 15 
years and to put them in perspective in order to identify long-standing tendencies and 
trends as well as crisis-induced changes; 
• second, to explore how and to what extent these developments and trends might be 
reflected, in one way or another, in collective bargaining in the coming years. 
The study tries to provide a fresh look at existing but often fragmented evidence to identify similarities 
and differences in developments, as well as convergences and divergences, from the bird’s-eye rather 
than the worm’s-eye view. 
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1Executive summary
Introduction
Collective bargaining systems, frameworks and practices in the EU have come under some pressure 
in recent years. Against a steady, long-term decline in the numbers of companies and workers 
covered by a collective agreement, employer organisations and some politicians and experts argue 
that the collective bargaining system is too static and inflexible. They insist that companies need 
more room for manoeuvre to adapt, specify and also deviate from higher-level agreements to respond 
better to accelerated global competition. This pressure has increased since the 2008 crisis, when 
a number of EU Member States, in response to high unemployment rates, implemented labour 
reforms aimed at increasing competitiveness, productivity and job creation.
Against this background, this study aims:
• first, to map developments in all major aspects of collective bargaining (apart from pay and 
working time, which have been analysed separately by Eurofound) over the past 15 years and 
to put them in perspective in order to identify long-standing tendencies and trends as well as 
crisis-induced changes;
• second, to explore how and to what extent these developments and trends might be reflected, in 
one way or another, in collective bargaining in the coming years.
The study tries to provide a fresh look at existing but often fragmented evidence to identify similarities 
and differences in developments, as well as convergences and divergences, from the bird’s-eye rather 
than the worm’s-eye view.
Policy context
In recent years, and in the context of debates about the competitiveness of European economies 
and labour markets in an increasingly global economy, the role of collective bargaining has gained 
greater attention from the key actors involved as well as from national and European policymakers. 
With significant and comprehensive legal reforms causing major changes and disruption within 
national systems, the debate about collective bargaining and its role has also polarised since 2008. 
Employer organisations stress that decentralisation, relaxing of central coordination and increasing 
use by companies of deviation practices from higher-level collective agreements are necessary tools 
enabling companies to adapt to the increasing pressure of global competition. In contrast, trade 
unions have stressed that such changes result in downward spirals in terms of working conditions 
and wages, a  rise in unfair competition, and the loss of the solidarity and social dimension of 
collective bargaining beyond company level.
This debate raises questions about the future role of collective bargaining, both in its core dimension 
of negotiating pay and working conditions at company level, as well as in its wider dimension of 
contributing to the quality of working and social life in society as a whole and to overall economic 
and social stability.
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Key findings
• Social partner organisations have experienced quite different changes with regard to membership 
density and organisational restructuring. The intensity of change also differs between geographical 
regions, reflecting different developmental stages.
• In terms of tripartism and bipartism, few common trends or development patterns are apparent 
across Europe. The changes that have occurred since the late 1990s and, in particular, the effects 
of the 2008 crisis have increased the significant differences in the role, dynamic and influence of 
tripartite as well as bipartite practices.
• Analysis of the scope and application of collective agreements shows, with significant time lags, 
a common and strong trend of convergence towards greater flexibility, providing the option for 
companies to deviate from collective agreements at a higher level.
• The overall trend towards greater ‘individualisation’ or ‘fragmentation’ of collective bargaining 
processes encompasses significant differences between EU Member States with regard to 
bargaining systems (multilevel versus company level), the role of the legislation, the involvement 
of social partners in the reforms, and the nature of changes.
• Analysis of legislative reforms and other developments before and after 2008 illustrates that the 
crisis has speeded up the changes in collective bargaining processes in specific countries, in 
most cases in a rather disorganised way, with a number of negative and adverse side-effects. By 
contrast, in some Member States, a few initiatives and developments have aimed at recovering 
a  certain balance between flexibility and coordination in the implementation of collective 
bargaining.
• With regard to the topics addressed by collective bargaining and the ability to influence labour 
and social rights and standards above the company level, a significant gap can be observed 
between two large groups of Member States, one of which has seen a widening of topics, while 
the other has seen a narrowing. The driving forces behind these developments vary, and there 
are signs that this gap has widened since the 2008 crisis.
• Analysis based on a widely used typology of industrial relations systems in the EU indicates 
that the boundaries between the clusters have become more permeable and blurred during 
the past two decades and since 2008 particularly. There are now more differences than 
commonalities between the countries within the Centre-East industrial relations cluster (Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic countries) 
and the South cluster (Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). While the differences 
in the Centre-West cluster (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) have 
increased, the similarities in this group remain more consistent. This finding is also confirmed by 
the assessments made by social partners at national level themselves: the groups of countries that 
have similar assessments are very mixed and do not reflect different industrial relations models 
clusters or simple west–east, north–south dichotomies.
Executive summary
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Policy pointers
Taking all the different developments and often contradictory trends into account, key issues for 
policymakers are:
• the extent to which the trend towards a narrowing of collective bargaining’s core functions persists, 
such that it is considered as just a mechanism for setting wages within a corridor determined only 
by firm performance, competitiveness and productivity;
• or whether a more comprehensive dimension of collective bargaining will endure, related to social 
integration, equality, avoiding unfair competition and influencing employment and working 
conditions as well as income and wealth distribution more broadly, one whose effects are not 
limited only to employees covered directly by bargaining agreements.
This research project suggests that the evolution of both these narrow and wider dimensions of 
collective bargaining since the late 1990s has been characterised by a growing imbalance, to the 
detriment of the wider and more solidarity-oriented dimension.
In a number of Member States, uncoordinated or disorganised decentralisation has been observed to 
result in an adverse polarisation and side-effects such as an abrupt fall in collective bargaining rates. 
Insofar as they erode the wider dimension of collective bargaining, these effects might represent 
worrying trends that undermine fair and inclusive labour markets and social conditions.
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Context and objectives of the study
This comparative study provides an overview of the development of national collective bargaining 
systems since 1997 in the EU Member States and Norway. It is part of a wider package of research 
projects being undertaken by Eurofound to take stock of existing research, providing fresh access to 
data and giving a condensed overview of developments since the late 1990s.1
Collective bargaining contributes to a solid foundation for the industrial relations systems in the 
Member States. In this respect, it deals not only with wages and working conditions, but also supports 
mutual trust between the actors, provides a rule-governed arena for channelling industrial disputes, 
and contributes to general macroeconomic progress at national level and to business performance.
The key role of collective bargaining in industrial relations, acknowledged in Article 28 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of December 2000, became primary EU law with the Lisbon 
Treaty and in Article 12 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989.
Thus, while the deep differences between the collective bargaining traditions, systems and frameworks 
of the Member States are widely acknowledged, the importance of social dialogue and collective 
bargaining is widely deemed to be an important part of a common set of social values and norms 
within the EU.
This study examines the main trends and changes in key aspects of collective bargaining, as well as 
likely future paths. It looks at the scope of collective bargaining, the role and influence of key actors, 
and other significant features such as bargaining levels, coverage and extension procedures, and the 
social partners’ views on future developments.
Encompassing the period from the late 1990s, this report covers a time of major changes within the 
EU as well as in Europe’s role in the global economy. It covers the fifth (2004), sixth (2007) and 
seventh (2013) enlargement rounds of the EU, which increased the number of Member States from 
15 to 28. It also covers a period that saw an acceleration of globalisation in trade, production and 
corporate practices as well as cultures. This resulted from the rapid evolution of communication 
technologies and digitalisation, and the growing influence of financial markets and shareholder 
value orientations in modern economies. Finally, the period includes the financial and economic 
crisis of 2008, which has resulted in unprecedented pressure on EU and national-level policies and 
on economic, social and labour policy governance. This phase is still far from over.
All these developments have had an impact on industrial relations and collective bargaining practices. 
In addition, longer-term changes in Europe’s labour markets, societies and ways of living and 
working have had significant effects on collective bargaining, the role it plays in determining working 
conditions and labour relations, the scope of bargaining, and the social partner organisations. These 
longer-term trends as well as crisis- and event-driven changes in collective bargaining have been 
addressed by a multitude of academic studies and comparative research covering various topics, 
broad themes and specific issues, with Eurofound being one of the most active institutions in this 
context. So, why another comparative study on the topic?
In contrast to other studies on collective bargaining developments, which in most cases focus on 
specific aspects and themes or the impact of various changes in collective bargaining, this study 
takes a more holistic view. It aims to take stock, revising Eurofound’s knowledge in this matter, 
1 The other projects are also comparative studies: one on pay developments, a second on working time issues, and a third on social partners 
and social dialogue, looking at new, emerging topics and innovations.
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and to analyse past and recent developments to provide a comparative overview of the past and, 
arguably, tendencies in the future.
Thus, two main objectives have driven the research:
• first, to map developments and relevant changes in collective bargaining (apart from pay 
and working time) over the past 15 years and to put them in perspective in order to identify 
long-standing tendencies and trends as well as changes more attributable to the crisis;
• second, to explore how and to what extent these developments and trends might be reflected, in 
one way or another, in collective bargaining in the coming years.
This comparative report is based on contributions from the Eurofound network of European 
correspondents in the 29 countries covered by the study, a review of relevant literature on the topic 
as well as contributions received in the course of an expert workshop in December 2014.
Structure of the report
The study is structured into the following main parts:
• a description of developments affecting trade unions and employer organisations, as key actors 
in collective bargaining, as well as developments in the influence of tripartism and social pacts 
on collective bargaining (Chapter 1);
• an analysis of developments in processes and procedures affecting the negotiation of collective 
agreements and how they are implemented (Chapter 2);
• an assessment of outcomes of collective bargaining in terms of topics addressed as well as 
changes in its functional levels (Chapter 3);
• an overview of longer-term trends that shape the impact of collective bargaining, such as 
bargaining coverage, centralisation versus decentralisation, coordination, and the influence of 
national and EU-level interventions (Chapter 4);
• a reflection on internal as well as external factors that are likely to influence collective bargaining 
in the future, including an overview of the social partners’ views on these issues (Chapter 5).
• finally, some conclusions are drawn in response to the key research questions highlighted above 
(Chapter 6).
Previous Eurofound and other research on the topic
One of Eurofound’s strengths is the continuity of research in its core areas of expertise over a number of 
years. Collective bargaining has been covered by both the European Industrial Relations Observatory 
(EIRO) (since 1997) and the European Working Conditions Observatory (EWCO) (since 2003). These 
two observatories were replaced by the European Observatory of Working Life (EurWORK) in 2014.
Thus, the annual reports on industrial relations developments in Europe produced by Eurofound since 
1997 (which since 2010 also include working conditions developments) provide a comprehensive 
overview of developments in industrial relations, including information on developments in 
collective bargaining levels, convergence between different countries and industrial action, as well 
as the focus of the bargaining agendas. The biannual Industrial Relations in Europe reports of the 
European Commission complement the picture (European Commission, 2011, 2013, 2015 and earlier). 
Eurofound’s publications also cover highly relevant specific topics such as new practices in industrial 
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relations in response to globalisation and demographic and labour market changes (Eurofound, 2002d), 
the influence of European integration on industrial relations (Eurofound, 2002e), industrial relations 
in the candidate countries (Eurofound, 2002c), quality assessments of social dialogue (Eurofound, 
2002f) and industrial relations (Eurofound, 2004b), a comparative analysis of changes in collective 
bargaining systems since 1990 (Eurofound, 2005a), collective dispute resolution (Eurofound, 2006a) 
and factors facilitating new forms of agreements (Eurofound, 2007d). Other reports concern specific 
actors in collective bargaining (for example, multinational companies: Eurofound, 2009b) or collective 
representation of groups of workers (such as the self-employed: Eurofound, 2010e) and information 
on collective bargaining mechanisms (for example, extension: Eurofound, 2011a).
Other sources of information are, for example, the monthly Collective Bargaining Newsletter compiled 
by a research team from the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) in cooperation 
with the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). This newsletter makes available further up-to-date 
information on collective bargaining in European countries. A continuous flow of data and information 
on collective bargaining developments is also provided by the information service agency Planet Labour.
The impact of the crisis on collective bargaining and the attempts of the social partners to overcome 
its negative effects have also been analysed by Eurofound in single research projects and comparative 
reports, for example, on social dialogue during the crisis (Eurofound, 2012b, 2012c) and the impact 
of the crisis on industrial relations, working conditions and wage-setting mechanisms in Europe 
(Eurofound, 2013a, 2014a, 2014c). Apart from the research and continuous monitoring carried 
out by Eurofound, the European Commission has studied this topic in the context of the Industrial 
Relations in Europe reports, mentioned above. Furthermore, the repercussions of the crisis on 
tripartite negotiations and collective bargaining have been addressed by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Industrial Relations and Employment Department (for example, Freyssinet, 
2009; Ghellab, 2009; Glassner and Keune, 2010; Hayter, 2011; Hyman, 2010) as well as by the 
OECD. Finally, the European social partners themselves and the ETUI (for example, ETUI, 2013) 
have carried out various activities surveying and researching how the social partners and social 
dialogue have responded to the crisis, including in terms of collective bargaining.
When it comes to key variables influencing collective bargaining, Eurofound has extensive data 
resources, including information by country as well as from a comparative perspective on density and 
membership of trade unions (for example, the annual industrial relations reviews from 1997 to 2013, 
as well as Eurofound, 2004c, 2007a, 2007b, 2009c) and employer organisations (Eurofound, 2004a, 
2010c), collective bargaining coverage (Eurofound, 2002a, 2007c) and industrial action over time 
(Eurofound, 2010b). Eurofound’s industrial relations country profiles2 as well as the Commission’s 
Industrial relations in Europe reports from 2000 to 2014 are very helpful in this regard. Statistics on 
trade union density and collective bargaining coverage per country can be accessed via ILOSTAT, 
the ILO’s central statistics database.3 In addition, for the period from 1990 to 2011, the Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) 
database provides data on trade unionism, wage setting, state intervention and social pacts.4
Thanks to these research endeavours, the authors of this report have been able to build upon an 
extensive data pool complemented by a multitude of national articles, reports and studies sourced 
by the national correspondents.
2 Available online at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/industrial-relations-country-profiles.
3 Available online at http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/home/statisticaldata. 
4 Available online at http://www.uva-aias.net/208.
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Box 1 Some findings from the Pay in Europe in the 21st century report
Pay across bargaining regimes
In this study of wage‑bargaining outcomes in Europe, Eurofound classified the bargaining 
systems of the EU Member States using Visser’s ICTWSS database as a starting point. This 
exercise identified six types of regimes that mixed different levels of wage bargaining and 
levels of coordination, and grouped countries according to regime.
A comparison of group medians within each wage‑bargaining regime showed that actual 
pay outcomes during 1998–2012 were, on average, lowest in systems with a high or 
medium degree of coordination. Countries with low levels of bargaining coordination – 
whether at sector or company level – had higher increases of actual pay on average. It 
should, however, be noted that in all regimes (except, perhaps, for the case of highly 
coordinated sector‑level bargaining), the range of outcomes was quite broad. The results 
might also have been influenced by the different overall economic growth of the national 
economies, specifically the original pay levels and inflation and productivity growth.
Findings differed slightly in the case of collectively agreed pay, with sector‑level bargaining 
(in countries with high and medium coordination levels) having the lowest outcomes; 
somewhat higher outcomes were observed in countries with low levels of coordination 
as well as in countries with highly centralised bargaining. It also should be noted that 
as wage‑bargaining regimes did not remain stable over time, analysing pay outcomes 
according to bargaining regime is sensitive to the year of classification used and can vary 
in some cases.
Collectively agreed pay and wage drift
In real terms, increases in collectively agreed pay were lowest in the country group with 
sector‑level and highly coordinated bargaining (the median increase was 0.5%), while 
they were highest in countries with intermediate‑level bargaining and a low degree of 
coordination (in which the median increase was 1.9%).
Wage drift, defined as the difference between increases in actual compensation per 
employee and increases in collectively agreed pay, was negative on average in Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Romania and Spain over the observed period; it was close to zero in Austria, 
France and Portugal; and it was positive in the remaining countries with available data. 
The wage‑bargaining context does not add much to the explanation of such differences: 
positive and negative wage drift of different sizes were found in each of the regimes, 
with the exception of decentralised regimes, where only positive wage drift was recorded. 
However, it is in this regime that the biggest gaps in data existed. These differences may 
also be influenced by the collective bargaining coverage rates (below 100%) and the 
effective year of application of the agreed increases.
Furthermore, in those countries that received recommendations to reform their 
wage‑bargaining mechanisms and in which there was a change in the level of wage 
bargaining or degree of coordination (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Romania and Slovenia), 
together with countries that were recommended to make reforms (Belgium, Portugal and 
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Spain) in 2009–2010, there was a turning point at which the index of actual compensation 
fell below the collectively agreed wage index, and the gap between the two started 
to widen. This implies that actual compensation grew more slowly than the collectively 
agreed amount.
One time‑sensitive finding in this area is the observed ‘countercyclical’ aspect of collectively 
agreed pay. Collectively agreed pay – to a greater extent than actual compensation – 
seems to act as a kind of ‘insurance’ for employees in times of crisis. It does not follow 
entirely the fluctuations in output. Together with the fact that, in many systems, pay 
increases lag behind productivity developments, it is advisable to look at medium‑ and 
long‑term developments instead of focusing on short‑term outcomes. Systems with more 
decentralised bargaining structures and less bargaining coverage seem to have less of this 
insurance function for employees, leading to a greater exposure of employees to wages 
risks.
Source: Eurofound, 2014e
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Developments concerning parties in collective bargaining
Key preconditions for a strong and functioning social dialogue between social partner organisations 
include a sufficient membership base, organisational capacity to negotiate, legal recognition, and the 
workers’ and companies’ confidence in these organisations. However, studies have shown a general 
pattern of decreasing organisational density, particularly in relation to trade unions (Eurofound, 
2010c, 2013a; Schnabel, 2013). This has been confirmed, by and large, by the current study, which 
illustrates a number of common trends but also divergent developments since the end of the 1990s.
This study has found no single country where trade union density rates are known to have increased 
since 1997 and just a few (Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Spain) where employer organisations 
have reported an increase in density. There are some countries where both employer and trade union 
organisations report a fairly stable situation with regard to membership density, and all of them are 
in western Europe: six employer associations – in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands; and three trade union confederations – in Italy, Norway and Spain.
However, somewhat in contrast to available comparative figures on density, other analyses come 
to other conclusions regarding membership and density developments. A striking example here is 
Belgium, where more recent studies have stressed that – unlike in most other Member States – trade 
unions have managed quite successfully to increase their membership (see Box 2).
Box 2  Trade union membership and the Ghent system in Belgium, Denmark and 
Sweden
A study published in 2012 found that trade unions in Belgium increased their membership 
rates between 2001 and 2010. According to the author, an important reason why Belgian 
unions are doing well is the so‑called Ghent system, which means that unions play an active 
role in the management of social security (in Belgium, almost 90% of unemployment 
benefits are paid through the unions). This may explain at least partly why Belgian unions 
have a growing membership, including amongst young workers.
The example of Belgium contrasts with developments in the Nordic countries, in particular 
in Denmark and Sweden, where trade unions have also traditionally had a strong position 
in the social security system via the administration of unemployment insurance funds. 
Here, a change of system immediately resulted in trade union membership decline. This 
happened in Sweden after 2006, when the membership fees of almost all unemployment 
funds increased at the same time that tax reductions for both union dues (25%) and fund 
fees (40%) were abolished. In Denmark, trade union membership similarly decreased 
after 2010, when the maximum benefit period of the unemployment insurance fund 
was halved from four to two years and the replacement rate level (the ratio of the 
unemployment benefit that an unemployed person receives in relation to the average 
income when still at work) was reduced.
Sources: Vandaele and Faniel, 2012; Eurofound, 2012d; Kjelberg, 2011.
As Table 1 shows, countries affected by a pattern of strong decrease (the bottom-right quadrant) saw 
a dramatic decline in membership density. These are mostly central and eastern European Member 
Social partners, tripartism and 
social dialogue
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States, where in several cases from 1997 onwards, trade union confederations lost more than 40% or 
50% of their members. However, these countries are not a homogeneous block but are characterised 
by diverging developments and an increasing variety of patterns influenced by political changes, 
for example with regard to membership developments in trade union and employer organisations.
In Latvia, membership trends in trade union organisations contrast significantly with trends in 
employer organisation membership. The Free Trade Union Confederation (LBAS) steadily lost more 
than half of its members after 1999 (from 206,354 to 97,593 in 2013) and the number of affiliated 
organisations declined from 33 in 1999 to 20 in 2014 (mainly due to the closure of large companies 
that dominated specific sectors). The country’s employer organisations have done much better, 
reporting increasing membership figures both before and after 2008.
Trade union membership developments in Poland display a  trend quite different from that of 
Latvia. Although the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity (NSZZ Solidarnosc) and 
the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ) experienced a gradual decrease in membership 
between 1999 and 2007, this was not as pronounced as in the prior period. However, what decreased 
substantially during this period was the number of plant-level trade union organisations. Since 
2008, this decrease of plant-level organisations has slowed, and the overall number of trade union 
members even increased between 2008 and 2012. Membership of the main employer organisations 
the Employers of Poland (Pracodawcy RP), the Polish Confederation of Private Employers Lewiatan 
(PKPP Lewiatan) and the Polish Craft Association (ZRP) overall has been stable or even growing 
since the late 1990s; only the Business Centre Club (BCC) reported a declining membership.
Table 1: Patterns of change in the density of employer organisations and trade unions since 
the late 1990s
Increase Stable Decrease Major decrease (> 40%)
Employer 
organisations
Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands
Germany, Italy, Slovakia,  
Sweden, UK
Estonia, Romania, 
Slovenia
Trade unions ‑‑‑ Italy, Norway, Spain Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Sweden, UK
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
Notes: Based on data comparing 1997–1999 and 2011–2013; data were not available for employer organisation density for all 
countries for 1997–1999; data not available for Croatia; for detailed figures, see Table A1 in the annex.
Source: Authors, based on ICTWSS 4.0 and contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
The gap in trade union membership rates between the ‘old’ EU Member States (the EU15) and 
the central and eastern European countries that joined in 2004 and 2007 (the EU10) had almost 
closed in 2000, when rates were 27.0% in the EU15 and 27.3% in the EU10. The gap seems to have 
widened again more recently, with the ICTWSS database reporting net membership rates of 19.4% 
in the EU10 and 24.3% in the EU15 in 2008 (see also European Commission, 2013; no more recent 
aggregated data for the EU15 and EU10 are available).
Developments in the number of social partner organisations, in other words changes resulting from 
mergers or the establishment of new organisations, have been much less pronounced than the 
changes in density. What stands out is an increase in the numbers of both employer and trade union 
organisations mainly in the EU10, reflecting changes in the structure of the economy, including 
the development of new sectors, the shrinking of traditional industries and sectors, and changing 
organisational structures resulting from privatisation (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Patterns of change in the numbers of employer organisations and trade unions since 
the late 1990s
Increase Stable Decrease
Employer  
organisations
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Norway, Spain, UK
Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Sweden
Trade unions Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK
Bulgaria, France, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg
Notes: Based on data comparing 1997–1999 and 2011–2013; data were not available on employer organisation density for Latvia 
for 1997–1999; excludes Croatia; for detailed figures, see Table A2 in the annex.
Source: Authors, based on ICTWSS 4.0 and contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
In contrast, a number of EU15 countries experienced a decrease in the number of organisations, 
resulting from attempts to increase efficiency, create synergies and provide better services to 
members. In Finland, for example, the two major employer organisations – the Confederation of 
Finnish Industry and Employers (TT) and the Confederation of Service Industry Employers (PT) – 
merged into the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) to strengthen employers’ collective voice 
by establishing a single peak employer organisation for the private sector.
In the Netherlands, although no large mergers have occurred, the Confederation of Netherlands 
Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) and the Federation for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(MKB), two of the three employers’ peak organisations, have intensified their cooperation during 
the past decade.
These and many more examples of organisational changes and changes relating to the coverage of 
companies and workers by national social partners’ peak organisations indicate that social partners 
act according to specific national environments, industrial relations pathways and other traditions 
that differ significantly. Not only do the differences between industrial relations ‘models’ have to 
be taken into account but also aspects linked to the maturity and relative stability of industrial 
relations systems (that may explain the intensity of changes). Furthermore – and here the need 
for further and more in-depth research is apparent – it seems that there are a number of common 
challenges for both trade union and employer organisations. These result from social, economic and 
political changes and drivers; a steady increase in the number of workers and companies that are 
not organised, for example, results in decreasing (financial) resources and organisational strength. 
While the major driving factors can be very different between countries (for instance, changes in the 
world of work, structural change, the image of the organisations and institutional embedding), the 
resulting organisational challenges are quite similar. In this context also, the question arises whether 
or not any ‘critical mass’ of organisational capacity exists.
Trends in tripartite and bipartite practices
Changes in the influence of tripartism
The role of tripartite agreements or social pacts and the involvement of the social partners in 
national-level policymaking is an important but also an extremely complex element of industrial 
relations systems. Tripartite cooperation may take place at different levels, and it may take the form 
of institutionalised cooperation or cooperation on concrete projects. It may be formal or informal, 
and it changes over time and from country to country.
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The importance of tripartism as a channel and instrument of influence within industrial relations 
differs significantly within the EU28 and Norway. While in all countries some forms of tripartite 
dialogue and consultation exists, the degree of formalisation and institutionalisation varies 
significantly.
The various forms of tripartite cooperation and concertation have changed considerably over 
time and with regard to different national framework conditions. In the 1970s, they were closely 
linked to the need to balance economic adjustment and price stability with income increases and 
social cohesion, in particular in the social-democratic northern and western-continental European 
countries. This combination of wage moderation and welfare expansion has become weaker since 
the 1980s, and concerns such as economic growth and competitiveness as well as employment and 
social policy reforms have become more important (Brandl and Traxler, 2011).
As noted in other research, in the 1990s, tripartite social pacts and agreements also emerged in EU 
Member States such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, where such practices had not previously 
existed or had no strong tradition (Avdagic et al, 2011).
Box 3 Tripartism and bipartism: Ambiguity of terms and functional equivalents
A problem for comparative review and analysis arises from an ambiguity of terms used in 
national contexts. There is no clear definition of tripartism that would be acknowledged 
and used across countries. Furthermore, in industrial relations research, the use of terms 
such as ‘agreement’ and ‘pact’ (either in conjunction with ‘tripartite’ and ‘social’ or not) 
by actors and researchers also varies across countries. And, finally, as the case of Austria 
illustrates perfectly, there is a  very vague boundary between tripartite ‘agreements’ 
or ‘pacts’ and ‘concertation’; although no tripartism (in the form of institutions and 
formalised practice) may exist, there might be a  strong and stable practice of policy 
concertation.
A similar and perhaps even greater problem arises in the case of bipartism because the 
difference between a ‘bipartite agreement’ (or ‘pact’) and a ‘cross‑sectoral or industry 
agreement’ is unclear in the comparative context. This is particularly striking if the Nordic 
countries are compared with southern European countries and also central and eastern 
European countries. While in the latter group, agreements between the cross‑sectoral 
or industry confederations often are referred to as ‘agreements’, ‘pacts’ or ‘accords’, 
these would be termed as ‘higher’ or national‑level collective agreements in the Nordic 
tradition.
In addition, in the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and afterwards, tripartite structures 
and practices were established with the active support and backing of EU institutions to stabilise 
the transformation process and strengthen the social consensus around it (Pochet et al, 2010). 
Although social pacts and tripartite practices are still present in most of the EU10, in many countries 
a weakening role and influence has been reported due to changes in government attitudes towards 
trade unions and employer associations (European Commission, 2015, p. 26).
The 2008 economic crisis had a significant impact on tripartism and social pacts. In many countries, 
tripartite consultation, concertation and ‘crisis corporatism’ (Urban, 2012) played an important 
role in the implementation of anti-crisis measures (Glassner and Keune, 2010; Eurofound, 2013c). 
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However, there are also cases where the crisis resulted in emergency measures without any tripartite 
consultation. In countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, this resulted in a crisis 
of tripartism (Eurofound, 2014c).
Tripartism and bipartism in the context of wage setting
Regarding the influence of tripartite as well as bipartite agreements on wage-setting mechanisms since 
the late 1990s, there were only three countries (Finland, Ireland and Slovenia) where government 
was directly at the bargaining table so that collective wage agreements at cross-sectoral level were 
concluded on a tripartite basis. For several reasons, in all three countries, the situation has changed 
significantly in recent years (see Box 4).
Box 4 Tripartite wage agreements: Finland, Ireland and Slovenia
In Finland, there is a tradition of tripartite general incomes policy settlements that dates 
back to the late 1960s. The government often played a key role in the negotiation of 
national‑level agreements that produced recommendations to negotiators at industry 
level. However, the system did not work every time – sometimes the negotiators could not 
agree at national level and only industry‑level agreements were concluded. In 2007, the 
tripartite system appeared to have ended when the private sector employer association 
EK refused to negotiate a new national agreement, insisting that negotiations should be 
at industry level to provide greater flexibility. Thus, the 2007 round of negotiations was 
conducted at industry level locally, and the main employer organisation indicated that it 
would not return to national pay negotiations in the future. The negotiations in the 2009 
and 2010 pay rounds were also at industry level. In 2011, in light of the economic crisis, the 
employers indicated that they would be willing to sign a national framework agreement, 
and this was duly signed in October 2011, marking a return to more centralised bargaining 
in Finland after a gap of five years. Following difficult negotiations, which at one stage 
broke down, a further two‑year cross‑sector wage agreement was concluded in 2013.
In Ireland, a series of National Partnership Agreements provided a non‑binding framework 
for pay bargaining from 1987 to 2009. However, the most recent agreement, signed in 
2008, was unable to withstand Ireland’s economic crisis, and the country has returned 
to company‑level bargaining in the private sector, following the withdrawal of the 
employers from the national wage agreement. The public sector continues to be covered 
by national agreements (known as the Croke Park and Haddington Road agreements).
In Slovenia, tripartite negotiations and agreements have also had a substantial role in 
wage‑setting practices, for quite different reasons, however. Tripartite wage setting has 
been used since the mid‑1990s to bring down inflation and limit wage dispersion as the 
country transitioned to a market economy. Until the end of the last decade, the Slovenian 
government and social partners signed a number of biannual tripartite agreements that 
determined pay rises and formed part of a broader ‘social agreement’. However, since 
2009, it has not proved possible to reach a similar wide‑ranging agreement, although 
new labour market legislation, which was introduced in April 2013, was discussed in the 
National Economic and Social Council of Slovenia (ESS).
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In many other countries (such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden), there are either regular or irregular tripartite framework agreements at 
national level that contain legally non-binding recommendations for pay increases.
Tripartite practice also plays an important role in the setting of minimum wage levels in a growing 
number of countries that have established statutory minimum wages, Germany being the most 
recent case. This role of tripartite negotiation and concertation has been described elsewhere in 
detail (Schulten and Bispinck, 2014).
Table 3 summarises the national information collected for this study, as well as from other studies 
(such as Eurofound, 2014a), on the main features of tripartism and bipartism in wage setting in 
Member States and changes in the influence of these mechanisms. It shows that most countries 
where tripartite or bipartite agreements between cross-sectoral social partners exist have experienced 
a decrease in the influence of such mechanisms. Two things are important to stress in this context: 
a decreasing influence could result from a weakening of tripartite structures by legal reforms or 
conflicts between the key parties involved; but it also could result from a joint understanding of 
the parties involved that wages should no longer be set at the highest level in a general way and 
more room for manoeuvre should be left at lower level. These differences with regard to the reasons 
underlying change are illustrated not only by the three countries described in more detail in Box 4 
(Finland, Ireland and Slovenia) but also by countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden, where tripartite and bipartite agreements have either been scrapped (as in 
Portugal in the second half of the 1990s already) or are used more as a broad orientation for wage 
negotiations and setting at other levels.
Furthermore, countries such as Hungary, Poland and Romania show a change from tripartism to 
governmental unilateralism with regard to wage setting. A similar development took place in Greece 
after 2010 as part of the financial assistance programme (Eurofound, 2013e).
Table 3: Main features of and changes to tripartism and bipartism in wage setting since the 
late 1990s
Patterns of development 
and influence
Countries, topics and trends
Strong or fairly strong 
influence and no 
significant change over 
the whole period
Belgium: Until 2011, the biannual cross‑industry agreements on wage development had an important 
influence on collective bargaining, leading to wage moderation. Since 2011, no cross‑industry 
agreements have been signed; the government decided to allow no wage increase above automatic 
indexation in 2013–2014.
Denmark: The bipartite Industry Agreement on employment relations concluded by the Central 
Organisation of Industrial Employees (CO‑industri) and the Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) at the 
beginning of the 1990s and renewed subsequently has been trend setting for the whole Danish labour 
market, private as well as public. The agreement was last renewed in spring 2014.
Netherlands: A social pact was negotiated in 2004–2005. After the crisis, in 2013, the government and 
the social partners agreed another social pact on the future of the Dutch economy, containing 66 
measures covering the pension system, labour market and industrial relations. These pacts had some 
influence on wage setting and were prepared by the bipartite Foundation of Labour.
Limited influence or no 
significant change since 
the late 1990s
Bulgaria: Low degree of influence; the agreement on anti‑crisis measures in 2010 had some influence.
Latvia: Annual tripartite agreements on minimum wage levels have a low degree of influence.
Slovakia: In 2000, a tripartite agreement that included an orientation on real wage adjustments was 
concluded but had only a low degree of influence.
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Patterns of development 
and influence
Countries, topics and trends
Influence varying since 
the late 1990s
Cyprus: Limited influence; for example, the tripartite agreement on pay and wage indexation 2014.
Finland: Central‑level bargaining has a strong influence but was interrupted in the period 2008–2011 
when sectoral agreements were achieved without a central‑level agreement on income. The social 
partners returned to the tripartite central table in 2011, but now to establish a framework agreement 
for the sector negotiations.
Germany: The influence of tripartism has varied. For example, in the context of the government 
initiatives on labour market reforms after 1997, the Alliance on Jobs had some influence but ended 
with conflicts between the unions and the employer organisations and had a negative impact on the 
trade union interests in tripartism. At the same time, both bipartite and tripartite initiatives on specific 
topics such as skills development and training have had quite a strong influence. From 2015, the 
tripartite Minimum Wage Commission has an important indirect influence on collective bargaining. 
In addition, the bipartite Apprenticeship Pact ended in 2014 with the establishment of the tripartite 
Alliance on Vocational and Further Training.
Influence decreasing
Estonia: The minimum wage since 1992 had been fixed by annual tripartite agreements. Since 2002, it 
has been fixed on a bipartite basis by the social partners (then implemented by government decree).
Greece: The National General Collective Employment Agreement (EGSSE), which included provisions on 
minimum wage levels, was suspended after 2010, and the new agreement signed in 2013 (without the 
Hellenic Federation of Enterprise, SEV) no longer includes such provisions.
Hungary: Wage and minimum wage agreements were set by the National Interest Reconciliation 
Council (OÉT) until 2012, when it was dissolved unilaterally by the government.
Ireland: A breakdown of the central tripartite wage agreements occurred after 2008, and bipartite 
agreements became more important.
Italy: The 2012 bilateral agreement of cross‑industry social partners shifted the wage‑setting 
mechanism from sector to company level.
Poland: Tripartite negotiations took place only on minimum wage levels. Since 2010, these are set by 
the government unilaterally because the social partners do not come to an agreement.
Portugal: The last income policy agreement at central level was signed in 1996. Today (and since 2006), 
only agreements on minimum wage level adjustments exist.
Romania: Until 2011, indexation of the minimum wage was based on tripartite consultation. Since 
then, it has been set unilaterally by the government.
Slovenia: Private sector bipartite pay agreements were in force between 1997 and 2005 before the 
employers left the agreement; in 2006, employers and trade unions concluded the private sector 
intersectoral Collective Agreement on the Pay Adjustment Framework.
Spain: Bipartite wage agreements in 1997 (providing guidelines) and 2002–2007 had some influence. 
No agreement was concluded in 2009, but from 2010 onwards agreements have been signed 
(orientation, not mandatory).
Sweden: The bipartite Industrial Cooperation and Negotiation Agreement played an important 
norm‑setting role for the wage structure in the economy. In recent years, there has been a trend 
towards a wage‑setting structure that does not set out to establish norms (in 2011, the agreement 
temporarily broke down).
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
In this context, it should be noted that in most countries that still apply some form of wage 
indexation (Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta), these systems have increasingly come under 
pressure from employer organisations, as well as governments (in the case of Belgium and Cyprus). 
In Cyprus, there is also pressure from European institutions in the context of the Memorandum of 
Understanding with the government for a reform of the system (Eurofound, 2013e, 2014d).
Thus, as a general trend – against all national specificities and with the exception of minimum wage 
setting (the most recent example being Germany) – it can be concluded from this overview that the 
role of tripartism as well as cross-sectoral bipartism in wage setting has been weakened by a mixture 
of various drivers, ranging from the joint political will of key actors involved to change imposed by 
governmental or employers’ unilateralism.
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Other topics covered by tripartite and bipartite agreements
This analysis shows that quite a large and, in many countries, increasing number of topics other than 
wage-related issues have been addressed by tripartite consultation, concertation and negotiation. 
Although the overall picture is complicated (and again driven by a broad and traditional national 
industrial relations context and different degrees of political dynamism as well as more recent 
changes), the overall conclusion of this mapping is that both tripartism and bipartism are perhaps 
becoming more complex, unstable and diversified. However, as Table 3 shows, irrespective of the 
national background and across the different industrial relations models, governments seek the 
support of social partners to reach a consensus on implementing major reform projects, in particular 
in the fields of employment, labour and social policies. Quite similar patterns can be identified in 
bipartite social partners’ initiatives, agreements and joint action.
As the composite overview in Table 4 demonstrates, tripartite and bipartite agreements and 
concertation covering social and employment policy issues, industrial relations frameworks and 
regulation exist in most EU countries (the only exceptions are Malta and the UK, where throughout 
the whole period no tripartite action existed). (Further details are included in the annex, in Table 
A3 for tripartite and Table A4 for bipartite practices.) More recently, and triggered by the 2008 
crisis, tripartite and bipartite initiatives have also addressed issues such as competitiveness and 
productivity. Again, it is important to note differences and nuances with regard to functions and 
influence. These reflect the broad patterns of industrial relations traditions and models in the EU, 
ranging from a strong influence in the Nordic countries to an important element of concertation in 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands to a more dialogue-oriented, consultative role in the central 
and eastern European countries.
Table 4: Policy fields and themes covered by tripartite and bipartite agreements at national 
level since the late 1990s
Policy fields Countries
Social and employment 
policies, including 
implementation of 
EU Directives
Agreements:
Austria (concertation), Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden
Dialogue, consultation 
and recommendations: 
Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia
Industrial relations and labour 
law, including collective 
bargaining practice and 
procedures
Agreements: Austria (concertation), Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain
Dialogue, consultation 
and recommendations:
Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia
Competitiveness and 
productivity, including 
anti‑crisis measures, 
since 2008
Agreements: Austria (concertation), Denmark, Finland, Germany (concertation), 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden
Dialogue, consultation 
and recommendations:
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
Note: Additional information on selected countries can be found in Tables A3 and A4 in the annex.
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
While Table 4 presents an overview of where tripartism and bipartism was used in policymaking, 
Table 5 provides a summary of changes in these mechanisms since the late 1990s. One pattern that 
emerges is that the countries where tripartism or bipartism has a strong influence and that have 
experienced overall stability since the 1990s all are located in western Europe; all other countries that 
report a more or less stable situation since the late 1990s are characterised by a more consultative, 
dialogue-orientated tripartite or bipartite practice.
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A second pattern is that in half of all EU Member States across all regions and industrial relations 
models, tripartism and bipartism have changed more or less significantly. There are western European 
countries where the influence over the period has varied (Italy, Germany, Finland, Portugal and 
Sweden), countries that are characterised by a decrease in influence of tripartite practice (Bulgaria, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Slovenia) and also three cases where the influence of 
tripartism has increased in relation to specific themes or topics: Estonia in the context of the reform 
of the Employment Relations Act; Latvia and Sweden in the context of anti-crisis measures where 
the government has been interested in achieving a tripartite consent.
Table 5: Influence of tripartite and bipartite agreements on topics other than wage setting
Patterns of development and influence Tripartite agreements Bipartite agreements
Strong or fairly strong influence and no 
significant change over the whole period
Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia (only public sector) 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain
Limited influence and no significant 
change since the late 1990s
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Norway
The Czech Republic, Ireland, Norway, 
Poland
Influence varying since the late 1990s Italy, Germany, Portugal Finland, Sweden
Influence decreasing since the late 1990s Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Slovenia (private sector)
‑‑‑
Influence increasing Estonia, Latvia, Sweden ‑‑‑
Note: Further information on selected countries can be found in Tables A3 and A4 in the annex.
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
A closer look at the character and dynamics of tripartism, as well as bipartite agreements and 
initiatives, illustrates that there have not only been changes in the incidence of and backgrounds 
to these practices, but also with regard to trends. More recent examples from France, Germany and 
Italy indicate that such agreements or pacts have become more strongly oriented towards issues 
such as employment security, labour market mobility and competitiveness.
France: There is a long tradition of national interprofessional agreements in France that have an 
important role as the basis for legal changes in fields such as employment policy, working conditions, 
older workers and social security, as well as adjustments of the industrial relations system. This 
tradition has been quite stable since the late 1990s and more recently has played a stronger role. 
A major recent development has been the 2013 ‘Social agreement on a new economic and social 
model fostering competitiveness and employment and career paths of workers’ (Vie Publique, 
2013) signed by all major social partners (covering all employees and companies in the private 
sector).5 The agreement not only involved a bundle of measures aimed at improving the capacity 
of companies to manage change, restructuring and increasing flexibility at company level, but also 
measures to improve the labour market security of workers, professional mobility, and information 
and consultation practice at company level, including board-level employee representation in large 
companies (Eurofound, 2013b).
Italy: In Italy, while there is no institutionalised tripartism, tripartite agreements in the 1990s 
addressed a large number of issues. These include income policy, pension reform, labour market 
reform and economic growth. In the 2000s, tripartite negotiations have become less common and 
positions between the trade unions have diverged more. There has also been greater government 
5 The signatories were Mouvement des entreprises de France (MEDEF); Union professionnelle artisanale (UPA); Confédération générale des 
petites et moyennes entreprises (CGPME, CFDT); Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFTC); and Confédération française de 
l’encadrement – Confédération générale des cadres (CFE-CGC). Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and FO (Force ouvrière) refused 
to sign.
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unilateralism; for example, the reform of the pension system 2011 and the labour market reform 
in 2012 took place without any formal negotiations with the social partners. However, tripartite 
concertation was revitalised in 2012 by the tripartite ‘Guidelines to increase productivity and 
competitiveness in Italy’ (Linee programmatiche per la crescita della produttività e della competitività 
in Italia), signed by all peak-level social partner organisations apart from the trade union the General 
Italian Confederation of Labour (CGIL). The guidelines put a strong emphasis on second-level 
bargaining, allowing part of the wage increases agreed at national level to be managed at local 
and firm level to promote productivity. Tax and social security contribution reliefs are granted for 
productivity-based wage increases set at local and firm level. Local or company-level bargaining 
rounds that establish wage increases connected to productivity indexes have to be performed every 
year. The legislation does not determine any limits with regard to how much of the wage increases 
can be bargained at the company level.
Germany: In Germany, too, the influence of tripartism has varied a lot since the late 1990s. While 
tripartism never had a strong tradition, examples such as the Alliance for Jobs between 1998 and 2003 
were disappointing, especially for the trade unions. However, there have been a number of tripartite 
and, in particular, bipartite pacts more recently between the social partners aimed at improving the 
skills base. These support further training activities or apprenticeships that were taken on board 
by the German government when it initiated two tripartite pacts or ‘partnerships’ in the autumn 
of 2014, one on skilled labour supply (Partnerschaft für Fachkräftesicherung) and one on further 
training (Allianz für Aus- und Weiterbildung). National-level bipartism has also played a role in 
the development and strengthening of anti-crisis measures in the wake of the 2008 crisis, aimed at 
preventing redundancies; this illustrates that bipartism has been driven strongly by events and issues.
These examples illustrate that despite all national differences, tripartism and bipartism are alive and 
constitute a dynamic sphere of industrial relations when it comes to coping with and addressing 
new challenges.
However, the changes that have occurred since the late 1990s and, in particular, the negative effects 
of the crisis on tripartism and bipartism in some countries also illustrate that – perhaps even more 
today than 10 years ago – marked gaps between the main industrial relations models in the EU 
exist. On the one hand, tripartism, ‘social partnership’ and ‘concertation’ are strongly rooted in the 
Nordic and western-continental models; on the other hand, central, eastern and southern Europe is 
characterised by much more fragile and unsteady practice that depends far more on political cycles, 
changes and will.
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In recent decades, a  constant fall in the numbers of employees that are covered by collective 
bargaining agreements has been reported in the EU. Nevertheless, and in contrast to other parts of 
the world, the collective bargaining coverage rate is still remarkably high: it has been estimated to be 
around 60% on average in the EU in 2012, according to the most recent figures from the ICTWSS; 
a similar share was reported by the 2013 European Company Survey (ECS) – see Box 5.
This comparative strength in the global context can be explained by the organisational strength and 
negotiation capacity of the social partner organisations, in particular the employer organisations 
(see, for example, European Commission, 2015, p. 28). The legal regulation and state-sponsored 
frameworks of collective bargaining have also been identified as crucial factors that influence the 
range and influence of collective agreements (see among others Traxler et al, 2001, p. 194). Here, 
existing studies have highlighted the existence and use of extension mechanisms to achieve a wider 
scope of application (Eurofound, 2011a). However, there are also a number of other factors that 
contribute to the stability and reach of collective bargaining agreements and the system as a whole. 
These ‘procedural’ rules are strongly linked to the role of collective bargaining at national level to 
avoid labour and social dumping and unfair competition between businesses, balancing territorial 
gaps, addressing specific sectoral needs and creating stability in situations of disputes. Such rules 
in particular are:
• rules governing the right to bargain and to conclude an agreement (often linked to the 
representativeness of signatory parties) as well as rules regarding the right to terminate an 
agreement (by either side, for instance, or only jointly by both signatory parties);
• rules for extending the validity of an agreement after its expiry (automatic continuation);
• procedures in cases of conflicts and disputes, such as peace obligations, mediation and dispute 
settlement;
• practices that support the coordination of collective bargaining, the links between different 
bargaining levels (favourability principles,6 hierarchies of agreements at various levels and so 
on) and the scale of centralisation of collective bargaining.
This chapter summarises the study results regarding developments in negotiation processes and 
procedures and the implementation of collective agreements. The focus is mainly on relevant 
changes that have taken place since the late 1990s.
To take into account longer-term trends and their qualitative and quantitative effects on collective 
bargaining, this section is complemented by Chapter 4, which takes a broader view on issues such 
as extension mechanisms, bargaining coordination, centralisation and decentralisation as well as 
other key aspects of national collective bargaining systems and practices.
6 According to the favourability principle, standards concluded at higher level can only be improved on for employees but not worsened at 
lower level.
Collective bargaining processes
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Box 5 European Company Survey: Findings on collective bargaining
Collective bargaining can take place at various levels. Even when it takes place at higher 
levels (national or sector level), it is likely to impact on practices at establishment level. 
In the 2013 ECS, 67% of managers reported that employees in their establishment 
were covered by one or more collective wage agreements. Coverage by collective wage 
agreements negotiated at the establishment or company level was reported by 30% of 
managers, while coverage by an agreement negotiated at the sector or regional level 
was reported by 29%, and coverage by a cross‑sectoral agreement was reported by 23% 
of managers. Coverage by an agreement negotiated for workers in a specific occupation 
was reported by 21% of managers. Differences across countries are very pronounced: 
coverage levels exceed 90% in Austria, Finland, Italy and Spain but are below 10% in 
Estonia and Latvia.
Employee representatives were asked whether there were negotiations on various aspects 
of pay at the establishment level: 43% reported that the basic pay was negotiated at 
the establishment; 36% reported that performance‑based bay was negotiated at the 
establishment; and 14% reported that financial participation was a topic of negotiation 
at the establishment.
Source: Eurofound, 2015b, p. 105
Developments in collective bargaining negotiations
Legal reforms and their effects
The decade between 1997 and 2008 saw a relatively large number of legal reforms and amendments 
to collective bargaining regulation, illustrated in Table 6. Legal reforms were especially numerous in 
the central and eastern European countries in the context of adapting national legislation to develop 
collective bargaining frameworks that match a market economy and the acquis communautaire (for 
example, on information and consultation rights or the autonomy of social partners and social 
dialogue). But in the pre-2004 EU Member States, too, most of the changes listed in the table were 
aimed at stabilising collective bargaining structures, processes and related institutions.
Collective bargaining processes were strengthened, for example, in regard to public services and public 
servants in Greece and in regard to trade union recognition and the rights of trade union members in 
Ireland and the UK. In Greece (2003), France (2007) and Austria (2008), the involvement of trade 
unions in political decision-making processes via social dialogue, codetermination or concertation 
was strengthened. Several reforms weakened the existing system. One example is Portugal, where 
after the so-called Colectiva Atípica labour law reform in 2003, collective agreements at company 
level that were directly concluded between management and groups of workers who were not 
organised in trade unions became more widespread (Ramalho and do Rosário, 2013, p. 24).
In contrast to the decade before, there were much fewer legal reforms that had a direct effect on 
collective bargaining processes after 2008. These were intended to strengthen collective bargaining 
processes in spheres that were previously only weakly covered (small companies) or where collective 
bargaining was restricted (public services). Collective bargaining at group level was established in 
the Czech Republic, while codetermination in company decisions was established in France.
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Since 2008, only the reforms that took place in Hungary and Romania (both in 2011) could be 
described as disruptive changes that seriously questioned certain principles of collective bargaining – 
the right to bargaining in Hungary and representativeness rules in Romania that practically made it 
impossible to conclude collective agreements above the company level (Trif, 2013).
Table 6: Legal reforms that have affected collective bargaining negotiations and processes 
since 2000
Before 2008 Since 2008
2000 Greece: improving collective bargaining processes in 
public services
Romania: defining of duties of employer organisations
UK: statutory union recognition procedure
2008 Austria: amendment to the Constitution 
recognising the central role of the social 
partners in the country’s system of 
policymaking
Latvia: defining of employer organisations
2001 Czech Republic: harmonisation with European law
Poland: establishment of regional social dialogue 
committees, amended in 2005
2008, 2010 
and 2012
Greece: mediation and arbitration (see Table 6)
2001–2004 Ireland: rights of union members in companies that did 
not recognise unions
2009 Luxembourg: single status
2002 Latvia: integration of existing regulations on 
company‑level collective bargaining into the new 
Labour Law
Slovakia: new Labour Code abolishing the previous 
limits on the scope of collective bargaining
2010 France: extending the scope of collective 
bargaining in public services
France: enabling workers in small companies 
to participate in elections for union 
representation
2003 Bulgaria: tripartite cooperation and procedures
Greece: creation of new social dialogue bodies on social 
protection and employment policy
Portugal: promotion of collective agreements at 
company level between management and groups of 
workers that were not organised in trade unions
Romania: strengthening trade unions in small 
companies and employee representative rights to 
participate in collective bargaining
Slovakia: strengthening autonomous collective 
bargaining
2011 Hungary: restriction of bargaining rights
Greece: possibility of simple associations of 
employees signing a collective agreement if 
there is no trade union
Romania: new social dialogue Act abolishing 
or weakening collective bargaining processes 
above company level
2004 UK: strengthening the rights of trade union members 
and coverage by collective agreements
2012 Czech Republic: collective bargaining at 
company group level
Spain: mandatory arbitration (see below)
2006 Czech Republic: strengthening collective bargaining
Slovenia: Law on Collective Agreements
2013 France: company board‑level representation
Lithuania: strengthening trade union 
membership rights
2007 Czech Republic: Law on Collective Agreements and 
Labour Code
Estonia: information and consultation obligations and 
rights
France: strengthening role of social partners on 
government proposals for changes in employment law
Romania: single‑table bargaining processes
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents and other sources
Conduct of collective bargaining
With regard to the way in which negotiations start (for example, which side addresses the other), 
including the need for certain social partners to establish legitimacy or representativeness, formalities 
during negotiations (for example, the need to conduct negotiations in a set time period) and handling 
potential conflicts during negotiations (such as obligations to keep the social peace), this study shows 
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that since the late 1990s, the EU countries have fallen into two large blocks. On the one hand, the 
majority of countries are characterised by a stable situation overall, with changes and adjustments 
aimed at stabilising and improving the whole system of collective bargaining. By contrast, there is 
a group of countries that have experienced much more significant changes that could be labelled 
‘system breaks’.
There have been many technical adjustments, relating, for example, to the obligation to start 
negotiations on a new agreement by a certain deadline before the old agreement ends (the Czech 
Republic in 2007), notification and registration obligations (Finland in 2001, Lithuania in 2003, 
Luxembourg in 2004 and Slovakia in 2007), and social peace obligations in the context of negotiations 
(Lithuania in 2003 and Italy in 2009) or as long as an agreement is in force (Romania in 2011).
In terms of the question of who is able to initiate negotiations and to conduct collective bargaining, 
the overall situation in most EU countries has not changed apart from some exceptions: while minor 
or rather technical adjustments were made in Luxembourg (2004), Croatia (2014) and the Czech 
Republic (2014), more far-reaching changes of the representativeness principles took place in France 
and Italy and are on the legislative agenda in Germany.
In addition, the UK practice regarding more active support of ‘single-table bargaining arrangements’ 
and the introduction in 2000 of the obligation to negotiate in cases of statutory union recognition 
have had some influence.7
Box 6 Multiple versus unity collective agreements at company level: France, Italy and 
Germany
In France, collective agreements are validated through the so‑called majority principle. 
This was introduced in 2004 as a condition for collective agreements to be regarded as 
valid; previously, it was sufficient for an agreement to have been signed by at least one 
trade union with representative status. A 2008 reform obliges trade unions to obtain 
at least 10% of the workforce votes cast in the first round of works council or similar 
elections to conclude agreements (8% at sector and national levels). Agreements are 
valid only if signed by unions (delegates) with an aggregated share of 30% of the votes. 
One or several unions that have obtained at least 50% at company elections can veto an 
agreement.
In Italy, in January 2014, the social partners CGIL, the Italian Confederation of Workers’ 
Trade Unions (CISL), the Italian Labour Union (UIL) and the General Confederation of 
Italian Industry (Confindustria) reached an agreement that formed the basis of the 
Consolidated Act on Representation, which addressed the representativeness of trade 
unions. The Act established the representative status through elections (at least 5%), 
stipulating how to conduct such elections, and defined the responsibilities of bargaining 
processes (including sanctions and arbitration procedures in cases of violation and 
conflicts) and the implementation of agreements.
7 According to this regulation, employers in companies where trade unions have gained recognition under the recognition procedure are 
obliged to negotiate over pay, working hours and holidays. However, according to research evidence, the statutory recognition procedure 
has accounted for relatively few new recognition agreements in the years since 2000 (varying between 10% and 20% according to year); 
see Gall, 2012. 
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The issue of multiple versus unity collective bargaining practice at company level in Germany 
has been the subject of constitutional debate in recent years. In 2010, the Federal Labour 
Court took the position that a company must apply all collective agreements settled by 
representative trade unions (Tarifpluralität). The ruling differs from the dominant practice 
of ‘one company–one collective agreement’. In 2010, the Confederation of German Trade 
Unions (DGB) and the German Confederation of Employers’ Associations (BDA) came out 
in favour of ‘collective bargaining unity’ (Tarifeinheit), stating that only the collective 
agreement signed by the trade union representing the majority of workers at company 
level should be applied. As of autumn 2014, the federal labour minister planned an Act 
on collective bargaining unity by summer 2015. At the time of writing, BDA is in favour, 
the DGB trade unions are split on the issue (DGB stepped back from the joint statement 
with BDA), and all trade unions other than DGB affiliates oppose the planned Act as an 
intervention into the right on strike.
In stark contrast to these adjustments, which were motivated by the aim of strengthening existing 
collective bargaining systems and processes and tackling weaknesses, ambiguities and lack of legal 
clarity, countries such as Greece and Romania have undergone changes that resulted in a significant 
weakening of existing national and sector-level collective bargaining processes and coordination 
in favour of company-level bargaining. The disruptions in Romania in 2011 (brought about by the 
Social Dialogue Act (Act 62/2011)) and in Greece after 2010 included a number of changes to formal 
requirements and details on conducting collective bargaining as well as new obligations with regard to 
industrial peace, arbitration and the ‘after-effect’ (their validity after expiry) of collective agreements.
In Romania, the new law abolished the previous system of obligatory annual bargaining rounds 
and the umbrella function of a national agreement covering a period of four years. The new law also 
replaced the existing obligatory branch-level bargaining rounds with ‘sector-level bargaining’ that is 
now linked to new and stricter representativeness criteria for all levels. For example, a trade union 
is regarded as representative and allowed to negotiate a single-employer collective agreement only if 
at least half plus one of the company’s workers are affiliated to it (compared to one-third under the 
previous legislation). This means that only one trade union can be representative in one company 
compared to up to three under the old legislation. When there are no representative unions in 
a company because there are not enough members, negotiations can be carried out by the federation 
to which the existing union belongs. If there is no union at all, negotiations will be carried out by 
employee representatives only.
In Greece, a number of new laws have had a significant effect on the industrial relations system – 
for example, reducing the period of validity of expired collective agreements, abolishing unilateral 
recourse to arbitration procedures, and establishing the possibility for non-unionised groups of 
workers to conclude collective agreements. In combination with other significant changes that have 
been described in detail elsewhere (see, for example, Clauwaert and Schömann, 2013; Voskeritsian 
and Kornelakis, 2011; Rocha et al, 2014; Eurofound, 2014a), this has contributed to a significant 
change in the Greek collective bargaining system.
Settlement of labour disputes
Most reforms that were implemented between the late 1990s and 2008 regarding the settlement 
of labour disputes could be described as supporting and strengthening existing mechanisms of 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration by clarifying rules and strengthening institutions or 
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establishing a more effective system. Most of these legal changes took place in the western European 
Member States, apart from the introduction of a conciliation procedure in Latvia in 2008, which also 
favoured smooth and consent-orientated arbitration.
In contrast to the decade before 2008, legal reforms since then have had a mixed effect, as Table 7 
illustrates. While the reforms in Denmark and Latvia (2008) aimed at strengthening and improving 
the systems of arbitration and conciliation, three reforms in Greece (2008, 2010 and 2012) resulted in 
increased barriers to gaining recourse to mediation and arbitration. Similar effects resulted from legal 
and other changes in Hungary (2011), Spain (2012) and Romania (2012). In Spain, following a 2012 
legislative reform, new decision-making powers were given to the National Advisory Committee for 
Collective Agreements and its equivalents at regional level. This consultative tripartite body can now 
intervene by means of arbitration, if requested by one party, to settle collective agreement disputes if the 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, if any apply,8 fail to solve the problem. Unions are strongly 
opposed to this move, as this body is an administrative one within the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Security, and they consider that this intervention undermines the autonomy of the social partners.
Table 7: Developments in the settlement of disputes
Before 2008 Since 2008
2000 Denmark: Conciliation Act, with new 
provisions governing the settlement of 
industrial disputes
Sweden: establishment of the National 
Mediation Office (MI) able to force 
mediation
2008 Denmark: legal status given to the system of industrial arbitration 
tribunals
Latvia: introduction of a conciliation procedure to resolve disputes
Greece: recourse to mediation and arbitration during bargaining in 
state‑controlled enterprises by joint agreement
2001 UK: introduction of voluntary arbitration 
procedure in unfair dismissal cases
2010 Greece: weakening of the Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED) as well as consequently the position of unions
2003 UK: reduction of procedural steps in disputes 
over representation rights
Portugal: possibility of compulsory 
arbitration being determined by the 
Minister of Social Security and Labour if 
a collective agreement expires without 
being replaced
2011 Hungary: main institution of national reconciliation changed 
to a professional advisory board (National Economic and Social 
Council, NGTT)
2006 Portugal: creation of a system of obligatory 
arbitration
2012 Greece: consent of parties needed for recourse to arbitration
Spain: mandatory arbitration in case of dispute concerning opt‑outs
Spain: weakening the autonomy of social partners, who are now 
obliged to accept the outcomes of mandatory arbitration decisions 
in cases of disputes concerning opt‑outs
Romania: modification of the mediation system that also includes 
certain obligations for parties involved
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
Amendments to implementation and termination practices
Principles governing scope and application
In contrast with countries outside Europe (Canada, Japan and the USA), most EU countries have 
a long tradition of extending the scope of collective bargaining agreements not only to members of 
the signatory parties (both of trade unions and employer organisations) but also to non-unionised 
workers as well as companies that are not members of the employer organisation that has signed the 
8 An alternative dispute resolution mechanism for the settlement of labour disputes exists in Spain based on a bipartite agreement between 
the social partners and is supported financially by the state. It is managed by a bipartite foundation (Servicio Interconfederal de Mediación 
y Arbitraje, SIMA), which handles the disputes by means of mediation, conciliation and arbitration techniques. 
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agreement.9 The topic of collective bargaining agreement extension mechanisms and the (significant) 
varieties of national regulation, implementation and application in the EU Member States has been 
documented and analysed in a number of comparative studies (see among others Schulten, 2012; 
Eurofound, 2011a; Hayter, 2011; Kamanabrou, 2011; Sciarra, 2007).
Before discussing this topic further, some key aspects of current extension systems and the various 
ways in which they are used should be highlighted. First, the extension of collective agreements 
to a wider area of application is widespread in Europe, particularly in terms of the coverage of 
non-unionised workers of a company covered by a collective agreement (erga omnes) but also 
with regard to companies not organised in employers’ organisations that signed the agreement. In 
addition, regarding the coverage of non-unionised workers, it should be noted that even in countries 
where agreements are legally binding only for trade union members (Bulgaria, Germany, Lithuania, 
Sweden and the UK), in practice the employers often provide the same or similar conditions for all 
employees within the company.
In terms of sector-wide extensions, there are currently only seven EU Member States where no 
legal mechanism exists for the extension of collective agreements to the whole sector: Cyprus, 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Sweden and the UK (although some elements of extension were 
under revision in 2014 and 2015; see the section on deviation from collective agreement provisions 
below) – see Table 8. In Italy, however, the constitutional obligation of employers to pay a ‘fair 
wage’ has been a strong functional equivalent of a legal extension mechanism, because judicial 
practice has traditionally identified minimum collectively agreed wages as a reference for assessing 
the fairness of wages.
While many countries have a legal framework to apply extensions, the right to extend a collective 
agreement may be subject to specific requirements (relating to the minimum coverage rate of the 
agreement or the representativeness of the signatories) or to state authorities being involved. In 
contrast, there are also countries where it is common for collective agreements to be extended (such 
as Finland and the Netherlands) and others where collective agreements are automatically or almost 
automatically extended (Austria, Belgium, France and Spain).
Table 8: Use of collective bargaining agreement extension mechanisms
Main features Countries
Extension is widespread, and most 
collective agreements are declared 
generally binding 
Belgium, Finland, France, Greece (until 2011), Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal 
(until 2012), Spain
Extension is widespread due to 
functional equivalents
Austria, Ireland (until 2009–2011), Italy, Slovenia (until 2008), Romania (until 2011)
Extension is possible but used 
infrequently or never
Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
Extension is not possible Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland (since 2011), Malta, Sweden, UK 
Sources: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents; Eurofound, 2011a and 2014a
Although the EU Member States’ basic legal frameworks and mechanisms for the extension of 
collective bargaining agreements have remained quite stable since the late 1990s, there have been 
some fundamental amendments and changes in certain countries more recently that have resulted 
9 Interestingly, the first examples of extending the scope of collective bargaining agreements can be found in Australia and New Zealand. In 
Europe, Switzerland was the first country that initiated such a regulation (though it was not approved in the first instance by the national 
parliament) before it was included in the collective bargaining regulation in Germany in 1918. See Schulten, 2012, p. 488.
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in a reduction of the extension of collective agreements. These cases (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Romania) have been documented and analysed comprehensively elsewhere (see Rocha et al, 2014; 
Clauwaert and Schömann, 2013; Ewing, 2014; Trif, 2013, 2014; Dundon and Hickland, 2014). In 
Greece and Portugal, the drastic changes that occurred were in line with recommendations in the 
context of the structural reform programmes (Voskeritsian and Kornelakis, 2011; Patra, 2012; Távora 
and González, 2014) – see Box 7.
In contrast with these developments that negatively affect the extension of collective bargaining, 
there are also a number of countries where extension practices have been strengthened by legal 
changes or other developments. For example, a slight increase of extension practices within the 
existing legal framework after 2008 is reported in Croatia, Bulgaria, Norway and Slovenia – in other 
words, in countries where the legal possibility of an extension of collective agreements exists but 
has so far been used very rarely.
Box 7 Drastic changes to extension practices and rules: Greece and Portugal
Until 2011, the sectoral collective agreements in Greece could be extended to all workers 
in the sector or profession if the agreement was binding for employers employing at least 
51% of workers in the sector or profession. The extension of the application, through 
the declaration of a sectoral collective agreement as obligatory, could also be requested 
by the competent trade union of workers or employers. In 2011, under Law 4024/2011, 
the provisions with regard to the extension of the application were suspended until 
2015. During this period, provision was made for the exclusive application of sectoral 
and professional collective agreements only when the employer was a member of the 
signatory employer organisation.
In 2012, the government in Portugal significantly increased the requirements for the 
extension of collective agreements, which had previously been commonplace. Following 
the Memorandum of Understanding between the Portuguese government and the Troika 
(the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB)), 
a quantitative criterion was put in place for the extension of collective agreements. 
According to this, signatory companies must now employ at least half of the workers in the 
sector, geographical area or professional category to qualify for an extension. Previously, 
there was no quorum, but the extension was linked to a ‘public interest’. Interestingly, 
the situation in Portugal is exactly the opposite of a change that took place in Germany 
after 2014, where the German government relaxed the strict quorum for extension and 
strengthened the criterion of collective agreements being in the ‘public interest’. In 
Portugal, the changes resulted in a sharp decline of extensions and subsequently the 
collective bargaining coverage rate. In June 2014, the government eased the extension 
criteria for employer organisations with a high share of micro and small enterprises.
In Croatia, for example, extension mechanisms were rarely applied before 2008, but since then, 
four collective agreements – for the wood and paper industry, construction, commerce and travel 
agencies – have been extended by ministerial decision. In Bulgaria, the possibility for extension was 
provided by law in 2001; however, it has been applied only since 2010 as the anti-crisis measures, 
negotiated in 2010, allowed the extension of few collective labour agreements in sectors such as 
mining, water supply and beer production. In Norway, extension was first used in 2003 but only for 
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a few agreements and mainly concerning pay and working time. In light of increasing labour migration 
from the EU10, the practice of extension has increased as key clauses of collective agreements have 
been made generally applicable within several industries, such as construction and shipbuilding. 
From 2008 onwards, the practice has remained stable and increased slightly in the last year.
New legislation positively influenced extension practices in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Slovakia. In the Czech Republic, there was a simplification of rules 
governing extension in 2005 (see Eurofound, 2006b); in Hungary, the establishment of sectoral 
social dialogue committees in 2003 was supported by the government; in Latvia, thresholds and 
criteria in 2006 and 2010 were lowered; and in Estonia, the High Court in 2008 confirmed the 
constitutional consistency of extensions. Apart from those in Latvia, all these changes took place 
before the crisis. In Germany, Italy and Slovakia, legislative changes that supported the extension 
of collective agreements took place more recently – see Box 8 for details on Germany and Italy.
Box 8 Enhancement of extension mechanisms in recent legislation: Germany and Italy
After a decrease in the number of extended agreements since 1997 in Germany, extensions 
per year were at a historic low before the crisis and in the dynamic recovery phase. In 2014, 
the Act for Promoting Collective Bargaining Autonomy (Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz) 
reformed the extension mechanisms under the Collective Agreement Act and the Posted 
Workers Act and allowed for an extension mechanism in the Temporary Agency Act. The 
previous threshold (50% coverage of workers by a sectoral agreement to be extendable) 
was abandoned and the legislation was amended to include the condition that an 
‘extension has to be in public interest’. The collective agreement has to be representative 
in terms of being concluded by the trade union with the most workers in the sector. 
By contrast, Italy was characterised by a  widespread practice of de facto extension 
confirmed by Labour Court rulings. The Collective Act on Representation in 2014 
introduced a regulation on automatic extension. Agreements signed by trade unions 
reaching a total representativeness threshold of at least 50% plus one and approved by 
workers through a referendum are binding for all workers in the sector and for all trade 
unions and employer organisations that signed the agreement. According to the Act, 
firm‑level agreements signed by the majority of the members of a workers’ representative 
body (Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria, RSUs) or by the plant‑level union structures 
(Rappresentanze sindacali aziendali, RSAs) that collect the majority of proxies conferred 
by employees are binding for all workers.
Slovakia has changed its regulations on extensions repeatedly, both restricting (2007) and relaxing 
(2013) the criteria. New laws in 2014 provided for the abandonment of quantitative thresholds 
in Germany. In Italy, the de facto extension by constitutional obligation was complemented by 
a general quorum criterion for the extension of collective agreements.
Similarities and differences in extension practices
Some commonalities in the development and change of extension practices across countries since 
1997 are worth highlighting, as are some differences.
Firstly, perhaps the most significant change has affected a number of countries in the group of 
countries previously characterised by a widespread use of extension practices, either directly by legal 
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provisions or by functional equivalents. This change has resulted in a significant decline of collective 
bargaining coverage, as the cases of Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Romania illustrate. In most, this 
change was crisis-induced and part of other far-reaching changes.
Secondly, there are very few cases where an increasing use of extension practices has been reported. 
Only in Bulgaria, Germany and Norway has the use of extension declarations increased during 
the past decade – all these are from the group where extension mechanisms exist but were used 
rather rarely in the past. In Germany, the increase resulted from a growing number of sectoral 
minimum wage agreements that were declared legally binding, while in Bulgaria (from a very low 
basis, however) and Norway, a (slight) growth of existing provisions has been reported. In Slovakia, 
the possibility to extend collective agreements was made easier after 2013 when the rule (introduced 
in 2011) that the relevant employer had to agree to the extension was abolished. In Germany, 
from 1997 to 2007, there was a continuous decline in the number of collective agreements declared 
generally applicable for a sector, and the number of new extensions decreased sharply, particularly 
in the early 2000s. Extensions per year were at a historic low in 2008. From 2008 to 2012, the overall 
number of extended agreements increased from 463 to 502, but decreased to 496 in 2014.
Finally, and also taking into account that there is quite a large group of countries where practices 
have been reported as stable (including all those countries where no extension practice exists), the 
overall EU trend since the late 1990s in terms of the widening of the scope of collective agreements 
by various extension mechanisms is quite clear: all in all, the application of widespread extension 
practices is becoming less frequent, while there has been little or no change in countries that are 
characterised by a very rare application of extension mechanisms. A further result is that change 
in regard to the functional scope of collective agreements has clearly accelerated after 2008, in 
particular in those countries that were affected most by the double-dip recession crises.
Termination and continuation beyond expiry
Legal changes to practices relating to the after-effect of collective agreements after expiry since the 
late 1990s affected just a few countries, in southern as well as central and eastern Europe. Most 
prominent are the southern European countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain, where there has been 
a tradition of automatic continuation of collective agreements in cases where no new agreement can 
be reached – see Box 9.
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Box 9 Changes to automatic continuation of collective agreements on expiry: Greece, 
Spain and Portugal
In Greece, the structural reforms following the Memorandum of Understanding 
included a law in 2012 that replaced the possibility of indefinite collective agreements 
(‘metenergeia’) by a minimum time validity of one year and a maximum of three years. 
Similarly, the after‑effect period of collective agreements has been reduced from six to 
three months. If no new agreement can be concluded during this period, all terms of the 
expired agreement will cease to apply, except terms on basic salary and social allowances.
Similarly, in Spain, the government put an end to the principle of ‘ultra‑activity’ 
(ultra‑actividad) in 2012, which previously allowed for the indefinite extension of 
expired collective agreements. From the beginning, the implementation of this change 
resulted in a significant decline of collective agreements reached at sector level. However, 
the Supreme Court has recently called into question this legislative change with its 
interpretation that the law does not distinguish between agreements signed prior to 
the reform and those signed after, and consequently parties may negotiate an extension 
where ultra‑activity clauses exist. Therefore, those agreements previously agreed remain 
valid until the next agreements are negotiated. Interestingly, the Supreme Court refers in 
this decision to ILO Convention 98 and Article 6 of the European Social Charter.
In Portugal, the structural reform programme called for an independent review on 
the survival (sobrevigência) of contracts that have expired but are not renewed. The 
Labour Code of 2003 and a new law in 2006 had introduced a restriction of the rule 
that a collective agreement could only expire if all its signatory parties would agree 
or if replaced by a new agreement. A further revision in 2009 introduced a reduction 
of the survival period and created a new regime for agreements with a survival clause. 
In August 2014, a new law was adopted that further reduced the survival of collective 
agreements that had expired and not been renewed from 18 months to one year. The law 
also reduced the time of a continuation of an existing agreement until a new agreement 
is reached from five to three years since the last time the agreement was published or 
after one of the parties expressed its interest in ending the agreement.
But measures relaxing the after-effects of collective agreements have not only been implemented in 
the southern European countries. In 2000, Poland introduced the rule that in case of the termination 
of an agreement, it should be valid until a new agreement is concluded. However, in 2002, this 
regulation changed, and the possibility for an agreement to be terminated unilaterally by either 
signatory party was established. In this context, it should be noted that the 2002 changes also 
involved the possibility for an employer to suspend the provisions of a collective agreement in 
situations of severe financial difficulties.
Also reflecting a trend of establishing more flexibility in the aftermath of collective agreements, in 
2012 Estonia introduced a new law that replaced the practice of automatic continuation of collective 
agreements after expiry and established the requirement that a continuation of validity must be 
agreed by the signatory parties.
These changes, which mainly occurred after the 2008 crisis, seem to illustrate a common feature 
with regard to the continuation of collective agreements after expiry. Existing practices of automatic 
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continuation have been scrapped, and the continuation of agreements today in most European 
countries seem to be based on a joint agreement of the signatory parties – at least after a certain 
period of time. Furthermore, as the example of Poland shows, as far back as 2001 it has been made 
easier for a collective agreement to be terminated unilaterally by one signatory party.
Deviation from collective agreement provisions
Different kinds of company-level deviations from national or sectoral collective agreements have 
received growing attention in recent years in academic and policy debates in Europe, particularly 
since the economic crisis started to put many companies and jobs under pressure.
There are various forms of deviations from higher-level collective agreements and possibilities 
for companies to do so. The reasoning behind deviations is that they are an instrument that may 
permit companies to overcome temporary economic difficulties without resorting to (mass) layoffs. 
This may help prevent workers from becoming unemployed, avoid costly layoff procedures and 
preserve human capital for the company. Although the use of terms is not always consistent across 
different countries, deviation can take different forms, such as opening clauses, hardship clauses, 
opt-out clauses for parts of or the whole collective agreement, or ‘inability-to-pay’ clauses in crisis 
situations.10 Perhaps more important than the concrete forms and types of deviations is whether or 
not the possibility to deviate from collective bargaining norms is linked to certain rules, procedures 
and clauses that are defined in the respective intersectoral or sectoral agreements or whether an 
opt-out or deviation can be decided unilaterally by the employers.
In particular from the trade union point of view, deviation from collective agreement provisions, 
namely on wages and working time, is a  controversial instrument because if applied in an 
uncoordinated way, it may undermine or weaken the regulatory capacity of collectively agreed 
standards and can result in downward spirals and increased competition between companies in 
a given sector on wages and working conditions.
The introduction of possibilities within collective bargaining systems that devolve the regulation of 
lower-level agreements (opening clauses) or which allow lower levels of bargaining to derogate from 
the regulations set by higher-level agreements in situations of economic hardship (derogation, opt-out 
or hardship clauses) is not a new trend. Controlled forms of deviation (opening, derogation, deviation 
clauses) as well as less controlled forms (such as general opt-out clauses) have been interpreted as 
major aspects of the trend of towards more decentralised bargaining and a strengthening of flexibility 
of collective agreements that began in the early 1990s in western Europe.
For example, in Finland since the early 1990s there has been a growing tendency for national 
collective agreements in the private and public sectors to contain opening clauses that devolve 
bargaining processes at company level, especially related to working time flexibility. Agreements 
on pay and labour costs are also fairly common in local-level agreements. In 1993, the tripartite 
agreement in Italy awarded the task of defining the issues that company company-level bargaining 
is allowed to deal with to sector-level agreements.
However, as Table 9 illustrates, various forms of deviation possibilities have been widespread since 
the beginning of the century.
10 It is not possible in the context of this study to give a comprehensive overview of the different forms of deviation practice and their evolution 
since the late 1990s; see Eurofound, 2010d for an overview of seven EU Member States.
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In Germany, opening clauses have been included in an increasing number of sectoral agreements, 
applying in the event of serious economic difficulties but also to improve competitiveness, safeguard 
employment and facilitate fresh investment (the Pforzheim Accord concluded in 2004 in the 
metalworking sector being the most important agreement). In Norway, since 2000, most private 
sector collective agreements have contained a clause allowing parties at company level to agree 
on experimental schemes on working time that are outside the level of the collective agreement; 
however, the provision is rarely used. Provisions stipulating derogation from minimal standards have 
been introduced into collective wage agreements in Slovenia since 2006 to save jobs.
As mentioned above, in 2002, Poland established the possibility to deviate from the provisions of 
a collective agreement in situations of financial difficulties. Also in France, the so-called Loi Fillon in 
2004 introduced the possibility of deviation from higher-level agreements unless such derogation is 
expressly forbidden in the higher-level agreement. The favourability principle, however, remains in 
force in respect of four themes: minimum wages, job classifications, supplementary social protection 
measures and multicompany and cross-sector vocational training funds.
Deviations from sectoral agreements were allowed at company level in Denmark in the first place 
as pilot projects addressing working time, cooperation in the workplace and further training. Before 
2008, any deviation had to be acknowledged at sector level. Today, the possibility of deviation at 
company level has been made permanent, and sector organisations only need to be informed.
Table 9: Changes in deviation clauses and practices
Opening clauses Opt‑outs Other deviation practices
Introduction or 
strengthening 
of deviation 
possibilities
Before 2008 Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway Estonia
Denmark, France, Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia
Since 2008
Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden
Bulgaria, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, 
France, Lithuania, Romania
No change Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, UK
Sources: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents; Eurofound, 2014a
It is clear from Table 9 that the possibility to deviate from the provisions of a collective agreement 
through opening clauses, opt-outs or other forms of issue-specific deviation practices became much more 
widespread in the EU after 2008, and legal changes since 2008 have been more intensive than before.
This dynamic is illustrated, for example, by Italy: the agreement of 1993 defined the general scope 
(and hierarchies) of company- versus sector-level agreements, but until 2009, there were no specific 
regulations on opening clauses, although in principle the possibility existed to include such clauses 
in sectoral collective agreements (Eurofound, 2011c). In 2009, a number of employer associations, 
including Confindustria, the major employer association, and the CISL and UIL trade unions signed 
the Framework Agreement for the Reform of the Collective Bargaining System.11 The agreement 
contains, among other things, the contingency for opening clauses, permitting company-level collective 
bargaining – or territorial-level bargaining concerning specific regions or cities in Italy – to change, 
for the worse, the rules of national sectoral collective agreements. It would apply in situations of 
economic crisis or to promote economic and employment growth. To reach these goals, it is possible 
for decentralised agreements to modify the contents of national sectoral agreements with regard to 
wages and other norms. However, the agreement also leaves open broad possibilities for the sectoral 
social partners to control the specific conditions and procedures of such opening clauses.
11 CGIL, the major trade union confederation, refused to sign the agreement.
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Countries that have not seen any significant change either have industrial relations models in which 
collective bargaining predominantly takes place at the company level or are cases such as Belgium 
and the Netherlands, which even before 1997 had established a system of national and sectoral 
agreements that contain provisions allowing or obliging employers and union representatives to 
negotiate certain issues at company level.
With the onset of the economic crisis and a consequent growing need for internal flexibility enabling 
companies to cope with the fallout of the economic downturn, deviation possibilities were promoted 
in more countries, namely in Bulgaria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia and Spain.
In cases of economic hardship, the possibility of deviation was introduced via legislation (Greece in 
2010, Spain in 2010 and Ireland in 2011) in sectors governed by binding wage-setting mechanisms.12 
In France, the possibility of temporary deviations from wage and working time agreements in 
exchange for job security was established in 2013, mirroring similar rules already established in 
countries such as Italy in 2011 (opt-out clauses from sector wage standards introduced in 2011) or 
Spain in 2012 (opt-out clauses in sector and provincial agreements).
Deviation practices have also become more widespread, particularly in response to economic crisis 
situations. While in Austria only a slight increase of opening clauses has been reported in recent years, 
in Cyprus a constantly growing number of opening and other deviation clauses has been concluded 
since 2012. During the financial crisis, the need to increase the flexibility of companies, especially 
regarding working time, was reinforced. Hence, in Norway most agreements in the private sector allowed 
for deviations concerning the implementation of the sector wage increase. In exchange for rather low 
wage increases, agreements in Germany featured a range of provisions for short-time work and other 
forms of working time reduction at company level – particularly so in the metal sector, to maintain 
employment. The same applies to the 2010 short-time working agreement in manufacturing in Sweden.
To increase productivity and competitiveness, elements of the sector-level bargaining agenda may 
be delegated to company level, a practice promoted by the 2012 Labour Code in Portugal as well as 
by the 2009 and 2014 tripartite agreements in Italy.
More frequent exceptions to the favourability principle
Since 2008, and most notably in the countries affected significantly by the crisis, not only have 
various possibilities for companies to deviate from sectoral or national collective agreements been 
made easier, but legal changes have also addressed the so-called favourability principle. In countries 
with multilevel collective bargaining systems, this principle has established a clear hierarchy in 
bargaining levels, according to which standards concluded at a higher level can only be improved on 
(for employees) but not worsened at a lower level. In most cases, it also includes the provision that 
collective agreements at every level may not include any provision that is below legal standards13 
(this rule was strengthened, for example, in Portugal in 2009 and Hungary in 2012).
The favourability principle has been weakened in the context of labour market reform packages in 
response to the economic crisis. In 2009, a reform in Lithuania stipulated that collective agreements 
may provide less protection for employees than laid down by law in areas such as dismissal notice 
periods and severance pay. And after 2010, Greece and Portugal introduced new rules that allowed 
company-level agreements to derogate from higher-level agreements.
12 In Ireland, a new Act on bargaining that reinstates Registered Employment Agreements (REAs) was agreed in 2014, which will allow for 
temporary derogation at company level in case of financial problems. The Act has not been enacted yet (see also, ETUI, 2014b). 
13 See the overview in Eurofound, 2005a, p. 11.
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Widening and narrowing of the topics addressed
According to a Eurofound study on social dialogue during the global economic crisis of 2008 and 
thereafter, the traditional institutional patterns of European social dialogue prevailed and remained 
unchanged in this period (Eurofound, 2012c). At the same time, the authors noted a number of 
changes, adjustments and new practices or innovations, particularly in countries where collective 
bargaining has traditionally been strong and stable. The study noted that the subjects addressed by 
collective bargaining have gradually broadened, increasingly addressing issues such as employability 
(vocational training), equal treatment of women and men, and the fight against discrimination. 
These results reflect other comparative studies (such as Hayter, 2011) as well as policy-oriented 
analyses of the quality of industrial relations (European Commission, 2002a).
Table 10 illustrates subjects that have been addressed increasingly by collective bargaining at 
various levels since 2000.
Table 10: Emerging topics addressed by collective bargaining since 2000
Economic themes Employment themes Work‑related themes
‑ Competitiveness
‑ Change management and 
restructuring
‑ Internal and external flexibility
‑ Downsizing
‑ Outsourcing and contracting out
‑ Agency and contract work
‑ Demographic change
‑ Early retirement
‑ Job classification
‑ Promotion and career development
‑ Integration of minorities and 
individuals at risk or with 
disadvantages in the labour market
‑ Gender equality and the gender 
pay gap
‑ Promotion of active ageing
‑ Mobility and career pathways, 
employment and redeployment
‑ Pensions
‑ Profit‑sharing schemes
‑ Dismissal rules and compensation
‑ Employability and training (vocational 
training and lifelong learning)
‑ Prevention of skills shortages
‑ Apprenticeship
‑ New forms of work (such as temporary 
work, part‑time work, telework 
and ‘economically dependent’ 
self‑employment)
‑ Work organisation
‑ Working conditions (also for 
subcontractors)
‑ Gender mainstreaming
‑ Non‑discrimination
‑ Reconciliation of work and family life
‑ Work–life balance
‑ Health and safety (including psychological 
work environment and sexual harassment)
‑ Corporate social responsibility
‑ Undeclared work 
Sources: Various Eurofound annual industrial relations reports, European Commission Industrial Relations in Europe reports 
and other comparative studies
While the overview in Table 10 indicates broader trends and the evolution of major themes addressed 
by collective bargaining generally speaking, before 2005–2006, particularly, issues related to working 
conditions and the regulation of new forms of employment (mainly atypical work) were addressed, 
thereby reflecting EU-level Directives and agreements such as those on telework, part-time work or 
temporary agency work. Against this general trend of a broadening scope of topics in collective bargaining, 
the current analysis and reports by Eurofound national correspondents allow for a more in-depth and 
detailed analysis of collective bargaining topics and their development before and after 2008.
Table 11 highlights the results of the information collected for this study, covering the period since the 
1990s. It shows that the development of topics addressed during the past 15 years is characterised 
not by broad and uniform trends but a concurrence of different tendencies and patterns of evolution 
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according to country and over time. Four general patterns of stability and change and clusters of 
countries are evident.
Firstly, there is a group of western European countries with well-established and stable multilevel 
bargaining systems, comprising Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, where the bargaining agenda 
at the end of the 1990s was already comparatively broad and little change has been seen since then.
The second group, comprising Croatia, Luxembourg, Poland and Portugal, is characterised by 
narrower bargaining agendas that have also undergone few changes since the end of the 1990s.
Table 11: Patterns of change in terms of topics addressed by collective bargaining
Patterns of evolution Countries
Stable with a broad 
bargaining agenda Austria, Belgium, Netherlands
Stable with a narrow 
bargaining agenda Croatia, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal (mainly addressing wage setting issues)
Broadening the 
bargaining agenda
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia (all before 2008, resulting from EU accession)
Romania (before 2011)
Czech Republic (after 2007, resulting from decentralisation)
Finland (after 2008, resulting from more flexibility at company level)
Denmark, France, Germany (as a result of decentralisation)
Italy (more flexibility at company level, small companies, bipartite funds)
Lithuania (regional social dialogue issues)
Sweden (as a result of decentralisation, training and skills, flexible workers)
Spain (flexibility and employment security)
Narrowing the 
bargaining agenda
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia (with the exception of skills development), Greece, Hungary, Ireland (all after 2008)
Romania (after 2011)
UK (steady trend)
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
Thirdly, there is a  larger group of EU Member States – representing quite different models and 
patterns of collective bargaining and industrial relations – where agendas have undergone broadening 
processes to address new topics. Although the driving forces behind these developments differ in most 
cases, major factors have been the integration into the EU of central and eastern European countries 
and Malta and greater flexibility and autonomy of company-based bargaining (decentralisation) 
in countries such as the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany and Sweden. Finland, Germany and 
Sweden, particularly, have seen a widening of bargaining topics at company level (most prominently 
on internal flexibility, such as short-time working systems, but also on supporting employability and 
skills development) in response to the 2008 crisis. Interestingly, during the whole period analysed, 
Spain shows predominantly stable bargaining agendas enlarged by incorporating specific themes 
related to flexibility or employment security, although the legislative reform adopted as a consequence 
of the crisis has tended to reduce room for negotiation on some topics that are now ruled by law.
In the fourth group of countries, the crisis has resulted in a narrowing of topics negotiated at different 
levels of collective bargaining. Significant change has taken place, for example, in Bulgaria, Cyprus 
and Hungary, where before the crisis new issues were addressed by collective bargaining, but the 
range of topics since then has been reduced significantly. A strong crisis-induced change is also 
reported in Greece and Ireland after 2008 as a result of redirecting collective bargaining to local 
level. A similar change took place in Romania after 2011 as a result of the 2011 Social Dialogue Act.
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The UK, as perhaps the only country in Europe where even by the end of the 1990s collective 
bargaining above the company level hardly existed, is the only EU country that is characterised by 
a steady process of narrowing the bargaining agenda throughout the whole period covered by this 
study, resulting from a continuous erosion and weakening of collective bargaining at company level, 
which tends to focus on basic topics such as wages and working time.
A recent comparative report edited by the ILO highlighted the ability of collective bargaining outputs 
in highly coordinated industrial relations systems to foster innovation and balance the interests of 
employers and workers (Hayter, 2011). The overview in Table 11 confirms this linkage between 
the narrowness or openness of collective bargaining topics, on the one hand, and the existence of 
multilevel and coordinated bargaining systems, on the other hand. It shows that countries with narrow 
bargaining agendas or those that have experienced a narrowing down of topics addressed by collective 
bargaining are also those with a rather weak multilevel and coordinated system of bargaining.
Changes in functional levels, decentralisation and coordination
Most EU countries have a  multilevel collective bargaining system that is characterised by 
a hierarchical or functional interaction between the different bargaining levels. As Table 12 shows, 
until the 2008 crisis there were only eight countries – all of them from either the West or Centre-East 
model of industrial relations (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland and the UK) – where collective bargaining took place predominantly at company level.
Table 12: Change in the dominant level of bargaining since the late 1990s
Bargaining system Countries Change in the predominant level of bargaining
Bargaining predominantly takes 
place at central or cross‑industry 
level, with binding norms or 
ceilings to be respected by 
agreements negotiated at lower 
levels
Belgium, Finland, Ireland (until 2009), 
Slovenia (until 2009)
Ireland: change towards company level as the 
predominant level of bargaining (2009)
Finland: change towards industry or sector level in 
the period 2007–2011, followed by a centralisation of 
bargaining
Slovenia: change towards sector level (2009)
General trend: company level has stronger role
Intermediate or alternating 
between central and industry 
bargaining
Greece (until 2010) Change towards stronger influence of company 
bargaining in an intermediate sector‑ or 
company‑level system (2010)
Bargaining predominantly takes 
place at the sector or industry 
level
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Romania (until 2011), 
Slovenia (since 2009), Spain, Sweden
Romania: change towards company level (2011)
Portugal: change towards stronger influence of 
company‑level bargaining in an intermediate sector‑ 
or company‑level system (2012)
General trend: company level has stronger role
Intermediate or alternating 
between sector and company 
bargaining
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece (since 
2010), Luxembourg, Portugal (since 
2012), Slovakia
No change, but strong role of company level as 
a general feature
Two countries have joined this model since 2008
Bargaining predominantly takes 
place at the local or company 
level
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Ireland (since 2009), Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania (since 2011), UK
No change
Two countries have joined this model since 2008
Sources: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents and ICTWSS 4.0
At the other end of the spectrum, there are four countries (Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Slovenia) 
where until 2009 bargaining predominantly took place at central or cross-industry level, with binding 
norms for agreements negotiated at lower levels. This group has experienced the most significant 
change. While there have been some trends of temporary recentralisation after periods of an increasing 
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role of sector-level bargaining in Belgium (due to the role played by the government in the wage 
negotiations of 2011 and 2013) and Finland (as a result of the return to cross-sector wage agreements in 
2011 and 2013), Ireland and Slovenia have experienced a notable downward shift in the predominant 
bargaining level. In Ireland, no new cross-industry social pact was signed in 2009, thereby ending 
a series of pacts concluded since 1987 and shifting bargaining predominantly to company level. 
A similar development was noted in Slovenia, where in 2009 the social partners failed to renew the 
cross-industry pacts that determine working conditions for sectors not covered by an agreement.
According to the ICTWSS database (see also European Commission, 2015, p. 31), there are three 
different forms of intermediate or alternating systems of multilevel bargaining that are more or 
less linked to predominant roles of sector- or company-level bargaining.14 Until 2010, Greece was 
a special case because it was characterised by an intermediate system of industry bargaining that 
was determined very much by agreements reached at central level. This has changed, however, 
due to the 2010 reform of the favourability principle that resulted in the sector or company level 
becoming the dominant arena of bargaining. Significant changes also took place in Portugal and 
Romania, where stricter representativeness criteria resulted in a weakening of higher bargaining 
levels, and lower levels became more important or dominant.
These changes make the landscape of national collective bargaining systems today very different 
from the end of the 1990s, as a result of the marked shift towards lower levels of bargaining and the 
absence of any example where higher-level agreements gained more importance. In a situation of 
accelerated decentralisation and an increase of deviation practices, the coordination of collective 
bargaining as well as refining functional and hierarchical relationships aimed at keeping the balance 
between lower and upper bargaining levels becomes more relevant.
Collective bargaining coordination
The coordination of collective bargaining refers to the relationships between the various bargaining levels 
(vertical coordination) or across different bargaining units at the same level (horizontal coordination). 
Moreover, coordination mechanisms can be based on different aspects of bargaining systems, namely:
• regulatory capacity (for example, the norms set in higher-level agreements);
• organisational capacity (for example, the control that central organisations can exert on 
lower-level bargaining units);
• a combination of both of the above (for example, pattern bargaining, whereby a particular 
agreement sets the reference for subsequent ones).
Against the trends of accelerated decentralisation and downstream shifts of bargaining competences 
towards lower levels, as already described, the need for stronger coordination of collective bargaining 
has certainly increased since the late 1990s throughout the EU.
In contrast to comparative studies that have argued that, unlike centralisation, there is no common 
long-term trend in coordination (such as European Commission, 2015),15 the national analysis 
carried out in this study produces a slightly different picture. Figure 1 suggests that bargaining 
14 These are a) intermediate or alternating between central and industry bargaining; b) bargaining predominantly taking place at the sector or 
industry level; c) intermediate or alternating between sector and company bargaining.
15 This difference may, however, also result from a definition of coordination (as in the ICTWSS database) that also includes government-imposed 
coordination. 
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coordination since 2008 has certainly not been strengthened (despite a potentially increasing need 
for it due to decentralisation), but rather the opposite has been the case – at least in a number of 
countries that fall into both major groups of either strong or weak bargaining coordination practice.
Figure 1: Features and trends in the coordination of bargaining levels
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents and ICTWSS 4.0
Throughout the whole period covered by this study, EU Member States could generally be divided 
in two groups of countries that tend to overlap with the Centre-West and North industrial relations 
models (with strong coordination) and the Centre-East and West models (with weak coordination).
There are a number of countries that can be regarded as ‘stable’ because no change or only marginal 
change has taken place since the late 1990s. These are, in particular, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, where coordination is at fairly high and stable levels (see Box 10 for more details 
on the Netherlands and Sweden). It also includes Spain, which before 1997 strengthened the coordination 
of collective bargaining, and the Czech Republic, the only country from the central and eastern European 
Member States belonging to this group. In Spain, however, coordination has recently been weakened 
following a reform in 2012 that decentralises to company level by allowing the lower level of bargaining 
not to apply the higher collective agreement. There are also countries in the group with a high level of 
bargaining coordination that have experienced a weakening of coordination in certain sectors (such as the 
public service in Germany) or temporarily (Finland). Similar trends are reported from France and Italy.
Box 10 Coordination within multilevel systems of collective bargaining: Sweden and 
the Netherlands
Swedish collective agreements can be classified into seven types, which can be further 
grouped into three categories: a) locally set wages with different restrictions, b) wage 
pots that are then locally distributed to employees, with different restrictions, and c) 
centrally set wage increases that may include a wage pot as well. Using statistical analysis 
on the data from the yearly reports of the Mediation Institute, there was a clear trend of 
the wage‑pot category increasing and centralised wages declining. It is noteworthy that 
this happened within the framework of sectoral or cross‑sectoral agreements.
In the Netherlands, the 2012–2013 agreement for the printing industry is a good example 
of ‘controlled decentralisation’. There are three types of provisions. The first category is 
binding to the signatory parties. The second category allows for deviations at subsector 
or company level, to be negotiated by employers and unions. The third category allows 
for deviations at company level after consultation with the works council.
Strong coordination
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,  
Netherlands, Norway,  
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
Coordination strengthened  
since 2008
‑‑
Weak coordination
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,  
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,  
Portugal, Slovakia, UK
Coordination weakened since 2008 
Finland (occasionally), France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
Mixed: France, Italy
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There has also been a significant weakening of bargaining coordination in countries of the group 
where coordination is weaker. In Ireland and Slovenia, the collapse of social pacts in 2009 resulted 
in diminishing coordination. In Romania, coordination totally broke down as a  result of the 
legislative changes introduced in 2011. Collective bargaining coordination has also been weakened 
significantly in Greece, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, according to the national reports. It has 
diminished most drastically perhaps in Greece, where not only was the national-level collective 
agreement suspended and the favourability principle abolished, but the option to conclude collective 
agreements with so-called ‘associations of persons’ who are not unionised was instituted. As the 
Greek contribution to this study highlights, this had immediate and negative effects on working 
conditions and wages – see Box 11.
Box 11 New types of company‑level agreements: Greece
The passing of a law in late 2011 allowed company‑level agreements to take precedence 
over sectoral agreements, leading to a proliferation of new agreements concluded by 
employers and mainly newly established ‘associations of persons’ at company level in 
various sectors of the economy. The negative impact of this on the workers’ incomes soon 
became visible and increased in 2012.
The vast majority of the new business‑level agreements provide for drastic pay reductions, 
ranging from 10% to 40%, compared with the levels provided for by sectoral, professional 
or older business‑level agreements. In many of them, the minimum pay in the enterprise 
is reduced and aligned completely with the minimum wage.
Another important result of this analysis is that in contrast to earlier periods (the most notable 
example being Spain), since the late 1990s there has been no single national example where 
collective bargaining coordination has been strengthened. Although there have been some attempts – 
often supported by European funding – in the Baltic countries (after 2008) as well as Hungary 
(before 2008), they have not resulted in any concrete effects of any significant coordination.
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Quantitative developments
A comparative report from 2005 on collective bargaining trends since the beginning of the 1990s 
highlighted that with respect to the overall number of agreements as well as the average duration 
of collective agreements, little quantitative change took place throughout that decade (Eurofound, 
2005a). By contrast, the current report indicates a growing variety of trends and tendencies.
Average duration of collective agreements
Most EU countries report that the average duration of collective agreements since 2008 has reduced, 
mainly as a result of the difficulties in agreeing longer-term provisions in times of economic and 
financial turmoil and accelerated change (Table 13). However, there is also a substantial group 
of six countries that report exactly the opposite. As this group includes countries with a multilevel 
bargaining system that is highly coordinated, such as Denmark, Finland and Germany, as well as, 
to a lesser degree, the Czech Republic, this may indicate the coexistence of longer-term, higher-level 
agreements with a  prolonged average duration that provide an orientation and framework for 
lower-level agreements that have shorter durations or are more flexible.
This pattern also characterises most countries that report an overall stability in the average duration 
of collective agreements (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland 
and Slovakia), as Table 13 shows.
Table 13: Patterns of change in the duration of collective agreements
Patterns of change Countries
Overall stable duration Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia
Reduced duration since 2008 Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, UK
Increased duration since 2008 Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Spain
Notes: Mixed results for Ireland and Sweden; no data available for Estonia, Greece and Latvia. For details, see Table A5 in the 
annex.
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
Although more substantial research should address this issue, one possible conclusion from these 
patterns is that countries with a functioning and stable system of multilevel bargaining that have 
also had decentralised bargaining practice in a coordinated way since the end of the 1990s have 
either experienced a comparatively stable situation in terms of the duration of agreements or even 
a trend for longer durations. In contrast, countries where the company level is the dominant level 
of bargaining have seen a shortening of average durations as a result of the worsening of economic 
conditions.
Number of collective agreements
Decentralisation of bargaining processes, on the one hand, and crisis-induced factors, on the 
other, also seem to determine patterns of change with regard to the absolute number of collective 
agreements in the EU Member States. As Table 14 shows, apart from the UK, all countries that 
have experienced an overall decline in the number of collective agreements are located in central 
and eastern Europe or in southern Europe; in other words, countries where collective bargaining 
predominantly takes place at company level or countries that after 2008 experienced an abrupt and 
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‘disorganised’ decentralisation – such as Greece, Portugal and Spain – resulting in a sharp decrease 
in the number of collective agreements.16
Table 14: Patterns of change in the number of agreements
Patterns of change Countries
No significant change Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
Decreasing number 
of agreements
Belgium (higher‑level agreements), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal (after 2008), Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain (after 2008), UK 
Increasing number 
of agreements
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany (particularly company‑level agreements), Italy (particularly 
company‑level agreements), Lithuania (sector level), the Netherlands (company level), Spain (until 2008)
Notes: No data available for Greece, Ireland, Hungary and Luxembourg. For more details, see Table A5 in the annex.
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
Developments in collective bargaining coverage
Bargaining coverage remained stable for the EU as a whole during the decade preceding the crisis, 
with a slight decrease from about 68% at the end of the 1990s to approximately 66% in 2007–2009 
(European Commission, 2013, p. 21). The decline since then has not only accelerated, but the 
differences in developments between countries have increased significantly. As Table 15 shows, the 
most dramatic decline in collective bargaining happened in those countries where unemployment 
increased most strongly as an effect of the 2008 crisis and where the collective bargaining system 
was the target of structural reforms. In Romania, bargaining coverage increased from about 70% in 
1999 to almost 100% in 2008 and then fell to only 35% after 2011; in Greece, it plummeted from 85% 
in 2010 to less than 40% subsequently; in Spain, it decreased from 80% to 55% since 2010; and in 
Portugal, it fell from more than 80% to less than 70% since 2008. These countries before the crisis 
had bargaining coverage rates that were clearly above the EU average.
There is a further group of countries that has experienced a decline in collective bargaining coverage 
above the EU average: Cyprus, Bulgaria, Ireland, Hungary, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
have all seen a decline of more than 10 percentage points. This decline can be explained not only 
by the effects of economic crisis, company closures and rising unemployment but may also reflect 
longer-term trends of restructuring (such as offshoring and outsourcing) and structural trends within 
the economy (for example, the shift from manufacturing toward services) that occurred even before 
2008 (as in Germany).
By contrast, there are countries where collective bargaining coverage has been relatively stable, such 
as Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy and Sweden. Furthermore, there are three 
countries where since 2008 collective bargaining coverage is reported to have increased slightly: 
Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands. This latter group of countries is particularly interesting as it 
is composed of countries that also are characterised by overall stability in their collective bargaining 
frameworks and less regulatory change, as well as a strong overall trend of decentralisation of 
bargaining (which, however, is carried out in a coordinated and organised way).
16 Between 2008 and 2014, the number of newly registered collective agreements fell by 71%, from 295 to 85, in Portugal, and the number of 
workers covered by newly concluded collective agreements declined by 87%, from 1.9 million to 246,000. In Spain, the number of registered 
collective agreements in the same period fell by 43%, from 6,000 to approximately 3,400, while the number of workers covered by such 
agreements decreased by 41%, from 12 million to just over 7 million. In Greece, the number of company-based collective agreements increased 
sharply after the new law came into force and provided for the conclusion of agreements at company level with lower-standard provisions 
than the higher-level agreements at sector level. Furthermore, many employers used the new legal opportunity to conclude agreements with 
non-unionised ‘associations of employees’. (Figures taken from ETUI, 2014a and information provided by Eurofound’s national correspondents.)
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However, this stable or even positive situation in some countries has not halted the general, and 
since 2008 accelerated, trend of a decreasing coverage of employees by collective bargaining. Table 
15 also shows that that the number of EU countries that have a rate of collective bargaining coverage 
below 40% has doubled since the end of the 1990s and that today in more than one-third of all EU 
Member States, the majority of employees are not covered by collective bargaining.
Table 15: Evolution of collective bargaining coverage
Very low coverage 
< 20%
Low coverage 
20%–40%
Medium coverage 
40%–60%
High coverage 
60%–80%
Very high coverage 
80%–100%
EU 
average
1997–1999 Latvia
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Estonia
Hungary
UK
Czech Republic
Ireland
Malta
Poland
Slovakia 
Croatia
Cyprus
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Portugal
Romania 
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Netherlands
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
68%
(1998)
Number of countries 2 4 5 8 9 28
2011–2013 Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Bulgaria
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Romania
Slovakia
UK
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Luxembourg
Spain
Germany
Croatia
Italy
Malta
Portugal
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Netherlands
Slovenia
Sweden
61%
(2012)
Number of countries 4 7 5 4 8 28
Sources: European Commission, 2013, 2015
From the figures, a clear trend of growing divergence emerges, with a growing gap between an 
increased number of countries with low or very low coverage rates and a  fairly stable group of 
countries that are characterised by very high coverage rates (only Spain has left this group since 
the crisis). This latter group also includes countries that have otherwise experienced either little 
change or strongly coordinated and negotiated change throughout the study period, such as Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden.
Impacts on national collective bargaining
In the previous section as well as in earlier parts of this report addressing changes with regard to the 
extension of collective agreements and various forms of deviations, country-by-country trends have 
been reported and conclusions on certain groups of countries have already been drawn. Here follows 
an assessment on a more aggregated level, considering the five industrial relations models that have 
broadly been accepted within the industrial relations research community.
Table 16 summarises the longer-term impacts of regulatory change on the five industrial relations 
clusters. In an aggregated way, it illustrates that the different clusters have not been evenly affected 
by regulatory change since the late 1990s but to a varying degree. In the North and Centre-West 
clusters, regulatory change mainly took the form of adjustments that followed, mirrored or fostered 
longer-term changes, such as a  growing diversification of workforces, stronger competition, 
decentralisation or new themes such as globalisation, work–life balance or equality. A  further 
feature of the North and Centre-West ‘adaptation model’ is that many changes were not imposed 
unilaterally by governments but were negotiated and agreed at tripartite or bipartite level. Thus they 
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have been implemented on the basis of joint understanding with the aim of balancing the interests 
of workers, employers and governments. (See Box 12 for a discussion of Germany.)
Table 16: Longer‑term impacts of regulatory change on collective bargaining in five industrial 
relations clusters
Low impact Some impact Significant impact Strong impact
North Denmark, Norway
Finland 
(since 2008, decentralisation 
and flexibilisation),  
Sweden
‑‑‑
Centre‑West Austria, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands
Belgium 
(steady trend)
Germany  
(different trends before 
and after 2008)
‑‑‑
West UK, Malta Cyprus Ireland  (decentralisation)
South Croatia (mixed impacts),  
France, Italy 
Greece, Portugal 
(decentralisation), Spain
Centre‑East
Estonia
Poland 
Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania
(EU accession, mixed 
impacts)
Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
Slovenia
(EU accession, mixed 
impacts)
Hungary 
(decentralisation), 
Romania
Source: Authors
Compared to these two clusters, the other three industrial relations models have experienced 
considerable change since the late 1990s, and there is also a more polarised picture within each 
cluster. The West cluster is characterised by overall stability and only minor regulatory changes 
in the UK and Malta, on the one hand, plus some impact in Cyprus and significant change in 
Ireland after 2008, on the other. In the South cluster, the effects of the crisis and the changes 
in the regulatory framework in Greece, Portugal and Spain contrast sharply with the moderate 
and more mixed impact of regulatory change on bargaining processes and outcomes in Croatia, 
France and Italy. It is important to highlight that in the three southern European crisis countries, the 
impact of regulatory change has changed significantly since the late 1990s: before 2008 – as shown 
in previous chapters of this study – legal reforms and adjustments often aimed at strengthening 
collective bargaining processes in their scope and coverage, while after the crisis, these regulations 
were interpreted as ‘too rigid’, and reforms fostered a rather uncoordinated devolution of collective 
bargaining towards the company level.
Similar developments characterise the cases of Hungary and Romania in the Centre-East industrial 
relations cluster, which is the largest and most diverse cluster. This diversity is also reflected in 
the impact of regulatory change, which is difficult to assess. All countries, of course, experienced 
adjustments at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s in the context of EU accession. 
The impact of regulatory change throughout the period differs and also reflects the influence of the 
social partners (which is stronger in countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia than, for 
example, in the Baltic states or Poland).
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Box 12 Collective bargaining decentralisation: Germany
To a certain degree, Germany is an exception to the Centre‑West model. The so‑called 
Hartz reforms, implemented against the strong opposition of the trade unions after 2003, 
had a significant indirect effect on the collective bargaining, as the massive expansion of 
flexible jobs resulted in an increased pressure on wages and collective agreements. They 
also accelerated the already strong trend of decentralisation and fragmentation (Schulten 
and Bispinck, 2014).
However, unlike in other countries, social partnership and the influence of trade unions 
underwent a kind of revival during the 2008 crisis, and jobs were successfully preserved 
through internal flexicurity agreements. In addition, against this experience of successful 
‘crisis corporatism’ (combined with factors such as successful trade union campaigns and 
pressure from EU institutions addressing the growing low‑wage sector and the rapidly 
growing income gaps), more recent regulatory change took the form of a strengthening 
of collective bargaining processes (via the extension mechanism) and the introduction 
of a statutory minimum wage. Against this, within the Centre‑West industrial relations 
group, collective bargaining in Germany certainly has faced the most significant impact 
resulting from regulatory change.
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Trends, drivers and challenges
The study so far has identified a number of longer-term trends as well as more recent developments 
within collective bargaining practices at national level that are likely to continue in the future. First 
of all, the long-term trend of declining coverage of workers and companies by collective bargaining, 
which was less pronounced but still present in the early part of this century and then accelerated 
after 2008, arguably will continue at a more-or-less steady pace. It is also likely that the increasing 
gap between countries that have a very high coverage rate of more than 80% and those where only 
2 out of 10 employees (or fewer) are covered by collective agreements will continue in the future.
This is likely to happen not only because economic changes in Europe’s labour markets involving 
shrinking shares of well-organised companies and workers and increasing shares of non-unionised 
and not-covered sectors, in particular in private services and the small company sector. The average 
decline of collective bargaining coverage and the fact that the group of countries with low coverage 
rates is steadily growing because of an erosion of countries in the middle – those with coverage 
rates between 40% and 70% – also results from changes in collective bargaining processes. The 
weakening of extension mechanisms and other supportive instruments (for example, automatic 
continuation rules) during the last decade in most European countries (sometimes directly by legal 
changes, sometimes indirectly, for example, by new and stricter representativeness criteria) have 
been particularly influential in this respect.
A further trend that will certainly continue into the future is that of the aligning of collective bargaining 
processes more closely with company-level requirements, especially with regard to competitiveness, 
productivity and costs. These trends of decentralisation of multilevel bargaining systems, the 
devolution of negotiation levels towards the company level, and the increased flexibilisation via 
opening clauses, opt-outs or derogation possibilities, as well as various forms of temporary or 
ongoing suspension of collective bargaining provisions at company level, are not new.
Decentralisation was already a major trend in previous periods and began long before the end 
of the 1990s. However, it had been largely limited to the high-wage and high-standard Nordic 
and western-continental countries in response to internationalisation and globalisation, to preserve 
jobs and keep labour costs competitive. Decentralisation was also implemented in a more or less 
consensual and highly coordinated way. More recent developments in central and eastern Europe 
and southern Europe, as well as the rapid acceleration of deviation practices in other regions (for 
example, in Germany, where employer organisations have established the option for companies 
to become members without the obligation to obey the collective agreement), show that the 
decentralisation trend of the past decade has become not only more widespread in terms of the 
companies and workers affected but also much more complex. Negotiated, centrally coordinated 
and ‘organised’ forms of decentralisation still exist, but there are also other forms that have been 
described as ‘individualisation’, ‘fragmentation’ or ‘disorganised decentralisation’. Furthermore, 
with the weakening or abolition of hierarchies of bargaining levels and favourability principles in 
countries where these have been forceful instruments, the decentralisation trend has reached a point 
where an increasing number of countries allow for a ‘tailor-made’ adoption of bargaining agreements 
at company level.
It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the future trends of collective bargaining practice 
and outcomes will rest entirely on these trends. This study and the developments and tendencies 
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in practices and framework conditions show distinctly that collective bargaining involves very 
complex and unequal levels of regulation and practice, with some common elements from country 
to country but also marked differences and diverging, non-concurring developments. In this context, 
tendencies and changes that contrast with the overall and longer-term trends of decentralisation and 
flexibilisation of collective bargaining are particularly interesting. And here, not only the examples 
of Belgium and Finland, which have experienced (temporary) phases of ‘recentralisation’, are 
particularly interesting, but also approaches in the Baltic states (after 2008) and in Hungary (before 
2008) to establish some kind of sectoral, regional or national coordination. Although these initiatives 
so far have not had any concrete or quantifiable results, they indicate that there seems to be a critical 
boundary for decentralised bargaining practice – if it becomes too fragmented and individualised, it 
becomes problematic.
These (and other) examples of deviation within the broader trend of decentralisation and flexibilisation 
bring us to the question of the role and function of collective bargaining in market-orientated 
societies. Collective bargaining has always been a search for a compromise between the interests of 
workers and employers. As highlighted in a report of a high-level group of experts on the future of 
industrial relations in Europe that was published in 2002 (European Commission, 2002b), collective 
bargaining has the potential to make an important contribution to good corporate governance, 
fostering modernisation and innovation as well as strengthening competition and meeting important 
challenges such as globalisation, technological change and changes in our social fabric and labour 
markets. However, there are other dimensions of collective bargaining that are equally important, 
in particular from the perspective of workers: it contributes to social cohesion and equality, creates 
better prospects for employment and improves living and working conditions.
In terms of meeting this double set of objectives, multilevel systems of collective bargaining or – in 
cases where they do not exist – functional equivalents such as bipartite or tripartite practices are 
necessary to achieve results beyond the company level.
And here, this study finds that particularly the changes in the regulatory frameworks, most 
dramatically in the crisis-ridden ‘programme’ countries, indicate a certain shift in the role and 
interests of political actors as the main regulators of collective bargaining. The structural reforms and 
the ‘modernisation of collective bargaining systems’ that have been repeatedly requested by various 
international institutions and the European authorities in exchange for financial support programmes 
after 2008 had a strong influence. With regard to the influence on wage setting, a recent Eurofound 
report has highlighted that this increasing interference within national collective bargaining is aiming 
at a ‘marketisation’ of wage setting:
Marketisation involves wage‑setting mechanisms becoming more sensitive to the market 
and business circumstances of companies through (further) decentralisation. Those 
countries where single‑employer bargaining constitutes the predominant wage‑setting 
regime, and where unilateral management regulation is usually more widespread than 
collective wage setting, have mechanisms which are already substantially marketised 
and decentralised.
(Eurofound, 2014a, p. 41)
This has resulted in a greater imbalance between bargaining practices that tend to serve the interests 
of the employer (‘market-orientation’, competition, productivity and costs), on the one hand, and 
various forms of ‘solidarity’, ‘composite’ or ‘integrative’ bargaining practices that focus on the 
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creation of win–win situations between employers and workers or support wider social objectives, 
on the other.
While, according to some commentators, the changes that occurred after 2008 in many countries, 
especially the ‘programme’ countries, reflect the emergence of a ‘new supranational interventionism’ 
(ETUI, 2013), this study has also shown that a shift from integrative, expansionist or solidarity collective 
bargaining towards competitive or productive bargaining in other countries had already taken place 
before 2008.17 An interesting example is the emergence and evolution of ‘concession bargaining’18 and 
the growing extent of flexibilisation and decentralisation of collective bargaining since the mid-1990s 
in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, but particularly Germany. 
Box 13 Recent developments and tendencies in Germany
According to an ILO working paper published in 2009, it was extremely difficult to control 
the process by which the collective bargaining system was eroded: ‘From the early years 
of the present decade until the beginning of the current crisis, erosion was aggravated by 
fragmentation through local concession bargaining, entailing deviations from collectively 
agreed industry standards’ (Lehndorff 2009, p. 26).
This fragmentation of the bargaining system, as well as the significant increase 
in more flexible and often precarious forms of work as a result of Germany’s labour 
market reforms after 2003, has fostered a long period of wage moderation, real wage 
decreases and marked expansion of the low‑wage sectors. These developments finally 
also had some astonishing effects in terms of collective bargaining structures and actors, 
notably a remarkable revival of trade unionism19 and a growing public awareness that 
the increasing imbalances and gaps in the development of wages, incomes and career 
opportunities that has characterised employment and labour market developments since 
the late 1990s has been an effect of the erosion of the collective bargaining system.20
Against this, Germany has recently experienced a quite impressive U‑turn in regard to the 
regulatory framework of collective bargaining and, in essence, aims at a rebalancing of 
bargaining outcomes by strengthening its distributive effects and orientation towards 
solidarity. The stronger political support for sectoral collective bargaining through the 
reform of the extension mechanism adopted in 2014 by the new law on the ‘strengthening of 
collective bargaining autonomy’ (Stärkung der Tarifautonomie), as well as the introduction 
of a statutory minimum wage as from beginning of 2015 clearly show this tendency.
The more recent developments in Germany, described in Box 13, as well the previously highlighted 
phases of recentralisation of collective bargaining in Belgium and Finland and the initiatives to 
strengthen collective bargaining and social dialogue coordination in the Baltic states indicate that 
the overall shift towards flexibility, erosion and fragmentation of collective bargaining throughout 
Europe may not be the end of the line.
17 On these terms and the different dimensions of collective bargaining, see, for example, Traxler, 2002. 
18 On this term, see also European Commission, 2011, pp. 11 and 110.
19 In 2013, five out of eight DGB-affiliated unions (among them the two largest, IG Metall and Ver.di) noted a slight increase in membership; 
see, for example, Dribbusch and Birke, 2014.
20 The Bertelsmann Foundation recently published a study highlighting the strong correlation between the increasing gap between low and 
higher wage groups and the erosion of collective bargaining coverage (Felbermayr et al, 2014).
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Social partners’ views
According to the social partners,21 collective bargaining processes as well as outcomes will change 
significantly in the coming years to better cope with current and future challenges and as a result of 
longer-term trends in our societies and economies.
In terms of the structure of collective bargaining systems as well as actors and processes, no 
significant further change is expected by the national social partners in Austria, Croatia, Latvia, 
Malta, Sweden and the UK. In these countries, the state traditionally has not influenced collective 
bargaining very much, and actors are expected to remain stable. In Austria and Sweden, the general 
stability will continue, and the sector will remain the predominant level of collective bargaining. 
However, in Croatia, Latvia, Malta and the UK, the company level already prevails, so further 
decentralisation is not relevant.
While state intervention has become frequent even in countries traditionally characterised by 
non-intervention, further growth in government intervention, quite surprisingly, is expected in only 
a few countries. Pressure on inflation rates and concerns over wage costs and competitiveness still 
have an important impact in many countries. However, with the exception of Belgium and Germany, 
the social partners do not expect their bargaining margin or autonomy to be threatened by the 
state in future. In other countries, the social partners expect greater intervention by governments 
in the regulation of collective bargaining, for example in the public sector (Cyprus and Lithuania), 
with regard to mediation and resolution of labour disputes (Cyprus and Estonia) or the application 
(Bulgaria) and regulation (Estonia) of extension mechanisms.
Concerning social partners and their relationships, decline in trade union density is closely linked 
to the restructuring of actors (mainly trade unions) as well as to the balance of power. Where the 
position of trade unions continues to be weakened (for example, by continued unemployment as 
in Cyprus), further mergers of trade unions are likely in reaction to the steady decrease in union 
membership. But the internationalisation of markets and a new political scenario could also entail 
a renewal of social partners’ structure and function, as is the case in Italy. Contrary to current trends, 
trade unions might gain influence due to a tightening labour market and demographic change or 
due to a gain in experience (the latter being a development that is expected in Lithuania). While in 
most European countries there are specific topics or sectors where the bargaining style might differ 
from time to time, major change towards a more adversarial bargaining behaviour is not expected.
When it comes to further decentralisation and flexibilisation of collective bargaining, the positions 
of employer organisations and trade union organisations, of course, differ in terms of objectives and 
orientation. For example, in countries where both social partners expect a further flexibilisation and 
decentralisation, trade unions highlight the need to implement these developments in a coordinated and 
organised way. In Cyprus, some trade unions will seek more regulation in collective bargaining, such as 
a sort of extension mechanism, as a way to prevent a further decrease in bargaining coverage. In Estonia, 
employee representatives highlight the need to increase the bargaining power of sectoral representatives.
However, there also are some interesting joint assessments with regard to future changes. For 
example, in Spain, even for employer organisations decentralisation is not a goal in itself. The main 
objective is seen to be to increase the efficiency of the collective bargaining system by more flexibility 
21 This study and the contributions from the Eurofound national correspondents included an exchange with the relevant national social 
partner organisations about their views and assessments regarding major trends in collective bargaining during the past 15 years and their 
opinions regarding major future trends. This section is based on their replies.
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at company level. While employer organisations strive for continuous decentralisation in Finland, 
deviations from the three-level centralised bargaining style are not likely from their point of view.
Also in Italy, where decentralised collective bargaining is becoming increasingly important, national 
collective bargaining will preserve its own crucial role according to the social partners.
As for Portugal, there has been a significant general decrease in bargaining both at sector and 
company level and that is not expected to change much. However, employer organisations expect 
that collective bargaining at higher level will regain importance in future through a new generation 
of framework agreements. Trade union confederations want to maintain and restore the sector level 
as the major pattern-setting level of collective bargaining.
These assessments of social partners reflect to some extent what has been highlighted above already, 
and illustrate the search for a new balance or to correct the increased imbalances between centralised 
collective bargaining, on the one hand, and individualised bargaining practices, on the other.
Table 17 summarises these and further expectations of major developments in collective bargaining 
according to the social partners.
Table 17: Major and likely future developments in collective bargaining systems and 
processes, according to the social partners
Social partners expect … Countries
No further change in the coming years Austria, Croatia, Latvia, Malta, Sweden, UK
Stronger state intervention Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia (legal reforms), Germany, Lithuania 
Change and reorganisation of actors Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Spain
Decline in trade union density
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
Changes in balance of power Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia (growing employee strength; demographic change), Ireland 
(growing employee strength), Luxembourg, Netherlands
Further decentralisation and flexibility Cyprus (individualisation), Czech Republic, Estonia, (individualisation), Finland, France, 
Germany (coordinated), Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
Drop in the number of agreements and 
collective bargaining coverage Czech Republic, France, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
Note: No information on Greece.
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
Regarding developments in collective bargaining outcomes (such as the contents and type of 
agreements and scope in terms of coverage) and the ability to address new topics, the social partners 
are quite positive about future expectations, as Table 18 illustrates.
In most EU Member States, the social partners expect a  continuing or even accelerated trend 
towards more pay moderation and more flexibility of collective agreements with regard to working 
time. Against the background of very modest or even negative real wage increases during and since 
the crisis in many countries, this assessment is worrying, as the gap between wage incomes and 
capital incomes is characterised by a long-term increase that is likely to continue in the future if this 
projection by the social partner organisations is correct.
While the opinions of the social partners regarding future trends in bargaining quality, wage 
development, working time and working conditions show little difference between countries in western 
Europe and central and eastern European countries, there are more differences between the major 
industrial relations clusters when it comes to ‘new’ or emerging topics. Here, it is mainly the countries 
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in the Centre-West and North groups that highlight the need to address issues such as employment 
security, technological change, well-being at work, skills development, equality, demographic change, 
restructuring, social security and the situation of young workers on the labour market.
Table 18: Important future topics and expected outcomes of collective bargaining, according 
to the social partners
Social partners expect … Countries
More wage and pay moderation Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, UK
More flexible agreements on 
working time
Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain 
More flexible agreements on 
working conditions Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, UK
Employment security becoming 
more important
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden
Agreements increasingly 
addressing technological change Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Malta, UK
New topics or issues that become 
more relevant to be addressed
Belgium (work organisation, well‑being at work), Estonia (migrant workers, skills 
development), Germany (demography, job guarantee for apprentices, coverage of 
non‑standard workers), Netherlands (restructuring, social plans and redundancy payments, 
pensions), Norway (pensions), Slovenia (youth)
Note: No information on Greece.
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
The overview of major trends that by and large shaped the development of collective bargaining 
since the 1990s and more recent tendencies, as well as the overview of social partners’ expectations 
of future developments in collective bargaining systems and outcomes, clearly show that in most EU 
Member States there is a general climate of uncertainty. There is also a growing feeling of standing at 
a crossroads with regard to the future of collective bargaining. After years of crisis-related emergency 
measures and hectic activities in the development of ‘structural reform’ recipes in countries where 
the multilevel bargaining systems were seen as too rigid and that have experienced an unprecedented 
and fast phase of catching up in regard to decentralisation and individualisation, there are also 
tendencies that indicate a further shift. Although it is unlikely that the old hierarchies of centralised 
bargaining will be restored, rebalancing the different levels of bargaining and strengthening its 
integrative and distributive dimensions is certainly on the agenda in many countries.
Of course, the future collective bargaining trends at national level, as in the past, will be heavily 
shaped by national traditions, very diverse regulatory, institutional and other internal drivers 
(including the organisational strength of social partner organisations and social dialogue and 
industrial relations cultures), and external drivers (specifically economic and social challenges).
It is, however, likely that the boundaries and differences between the five models of industrial 
relations have become more permeable and blurred during the past decade and particularly since 
2008. Already today, for example, it is increasingly obvious that there are perhaps more differences 
than commonalities within the Centre-East industrial relations model.
This scenario of divergence and convergence is also confirmed by the assessments made by social 
partners at national level themselves. A striking result of the overview tables above is that the groups 
of countries that come to similar assessments are very mixed and do not reflect different industrial 
relations models or even a simply west–east, north–south dichotomy.
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Acceleration of change, convergence and divergence
After a decade of relative stability in the 1990s, collective bargaining systems and processes in the 
EU since the end of that decade have undergone a steady change that has accelerated since 2008. 
The main indicators of this change are the more rapid decline of coverage rates and regulatory 
changes in a number of collective bargaining practices and processes, particularly with regard 
to the extension of collective agreements, functional hierarchies and the growing importance of 
company-based bargaining processes.
This acceleration of change has affected not just the countries that experienced the worst of the crisis. 
In fact, the adjustment and significant shift towards more decentralised and sometimes fragmented 
and individualised bargaining systems seem to be a process of catching up, whereby countries 
in southern Europe, in particular, have caught up with developments that occurred previously in 
other countries. However, whereas the decentralisation and flexibilisation of multilevel bargaining 
systems and practices in the Nordic countries and western-continental Europe was implemented in 
a gradual and coordinated way based – more or less – on tripartite consultation and concertation, 
the shift in countries such as Greece, Portugal, Romania and Spain has been much more abrupt 
and disorganised, often imposed unilaterally by government. Because this regulatory change was 
implemented in a largely uncontrolled and disorganised way, it resulted in rapid fragmentation and 
individualisation of collective bargaining practices on the ground at company level.
As a result, this overall trend of decentralisation and flexibilisation has made the demarcation lines 
between different systems of collective bargaining more blurred and permeable. In addition, the 
social, equity-related and redistributive aspects of collective bargaining and its subsidiary role in 
regard to social and employment security have been weakened.
This study has highlighted a common and strong trend of convergence towards a greater flexibility 
of collective bargaining processes. It also finds that this flexibilisation is more widespread in those 
countries that started to make their multilevel bargaining systems more flexible even before the end 
of the 1990s. In addition, it has been taking place in countries, particularly the central and eastern 
European countries, that have always been characterised by bargaining processes predominantly 
at company level. And it has finally also become a stronger reality in those countries that until the 
2008 crisis resisted this trend.
However, the common trend towards flexibility in collective bargaining processes does not mean 
that all EU countries have experienced uniform and similar developments since the end of the 
1990s. There were also moves in different and even opposite directions. To explain these divergent 
developments, it is important to consider the differences in the point of departure (especially the 
degree of flexibility from the company point of view), the organisational strength and influence of 
key actors involved as well as the external pressure (such as unemployment, competition and the 
financial circumstances of companies).
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Figure 2: The intensity of change in collective bargaining since 1997
Source: Authors, based on Table A7 in the annex
Despite all asymmetries and asynchronicities in the timing and pace of these changes, the underlying 
trends result from an increasing economic pressure on companies, sectors and countries in the 
EU and the need to adjust labour costs and improve productivity. In this context, the speed of 
globalisation since the end of the 1990s and the intensity today of the integration in global production 
and business networks should be considered. The strongly growing influence of foreign shareholder 
interests, owners and multinational companies are also influential factors.
Growing discrepancies in roles and influence
This relative convergence of collective bargaining systems and practices within the EU does not imply 
that major differences between industrial relations models and collective bargaining practices and 
outcomes have diminished. Rather the opposite is the case, when not only quantitative indicators but 
also more qualitative aspects such as the role and influence of collective bargaining and key actors 
(including various forms of bipartism, tripartism, concertation and so on) are taken into account.
A major result of this study in this context is that since 2008 the gap has broadened between countries that 
are characterised by a comparatively high organisational strength of social partner organisations, stable 
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and influential practices and institutions of various forms of tripartism, and a broad collective bargaining 
agenda, on the one hand, and countries where industrial relations actors, processes and outcomes are 
weaker, on the other hand. For example, in terms of the membership density of trade union and employer 
organisations, all the countries that have experienced the strongest decline in density since the end of the 
1990s are located in central and eastern Europe, whereas all the countries that report relative stability are 
in western Europe. But not only is there a growing gap; in terms of the influence of tripartism and tripartite 
practices on public policies, the shrinking group of countries where influence is reported to be significant 
and goes beyond symbolic action or mere dialogue, consultation and information are also located in 
western Europe. Similar features emerge with regard to the influence of social partners and concertation 
on anti-crisis programmes or social policy packages in response to labour market problems. A further 
clear result is that there is a stark contrast between those (few) countries that report a stable situation and 
a broadening collective bargaining agenda that covers not only core items but also contributes to coping 
with major economic, social and other challenges and those countries that have experienced a significant 
narrowing of bargaining agendas during the past decade. The latter group consists of many countries in 
central and eastern, north-western and southern Europe.
Finally, there is the development of collective bargaining coverage rates since the late 1990s, perhaps 
the most dramatic indicator of growing discrepancies. Here, a pattern of growing polarisation and an 
‘erosion of the middle’ of national collective bargaining systems clearly emerges. When clustering 
countries by coverage rate, it becomes evident that the only group characterised by relative stability 
is the group of around eight countries that have a very high collective bargaining coverage rate of 
more than 80%. By contrast, the group with collective bargaining systems that have a medium to 
high rate of coverage (between 40% and 80%) has eroded significantly during the study period. In 
particular, the group of countries that at the end of the 1990s had a high coverage rate of 60%–80% 
experienced the strongest contraction, from eight countries to only four countries today. As a result, 
a substantial number of EU Member States today have low collective bargaining coverage of less 
than 40%. This group also experienced the strongest growth in numbers (from 6 to 11), consisting 
mostly of countries in central and eastern Europe, plus Greece, Ireland and the UK.
Hence, it could be stated that trends of convergence of collective bargaining systems and practices at 
the underlying level of collective bargaining institutions, actors and practices is paralleled by growing 
discrepancies between relative stability in a small group of countries and steady to accelerated 
erosion in the rest.
As a result, and in sharp contrast to the situation at the end of the 1990s, the collective bargaining 
landscape in the EU today has two characteristic features.
• A relatively small core of countries in the Nordic and western-continental regions where collective 
bargaining still functions as an important and institutionalised component of the welfare system, having 
a significant influence on the distribution of income and wealth, social justice and improvements in 
employment and working conditions. Decentralisation processes and a stronger orientation of collective 
bargaining outcomes towards productivity and competitiveness are, by and large, implemented in 
a consensual and organised way, shaped by central coordination, particularly at sector level.
• A larger group of countries where the non-wage functions of collective bargaining have 
traditionally been limited, either because of low union and employer organisational strength and 
a weak influence of collective bargaining above company level or because of abrupt changes and 
disruptions within the key institutional settings of collective bargaining. And it is in this group 
where the future role of collective bargaining is much more under stress, vague and unclear.
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It is important to highlight that this second group is far from homogeneous, being characterised 
by a significant degree of internal variation of, for example, organisational strength, regulatory 
frameworks of collective bargaining, and industrial relations traditions and cultures. This study 
has also shown that before as well as since the crisis there have been differences in regulatory 
dynamism (for instance, initiatives to strengthen the extension of collective bargaining agreements 
and bargaining coordination at sector level, broadening of topics addressed by bargaining, but 
also governmental unilateralism that undermined the existing system and practices of collective 
bargaining).
Persistence of typologies but different patterns of change
A recent Eurofound report on the impact of the crisis on industrial relations and working conditions 
has already raised the question of whether the severity of the impact of the crisis on industrial 
relations can in any way be linked to industrial relations typologies (Eurofound, 2014c). This report 
and various other authors in general agree that the effects of the crisis on industrial relations are 
characterised both by the persistence of different paths (of different economic and social regimes) as 
well as common industrial relations trends (namely decentralisation and erosion of multiemployer 
bargaining) that according to some authors (Glassner, 2013; Hyman, 2010) also reflect a general 
shift toward ‘neo’ or market liberalism.
This study confirms that the 2008 crisis was the most important event that has taken place since the 
late 1990s in regard to the overall landscape of industrial relations in the EU. This is particularly 
true for some southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and a few central and 
eastern European countries. In all other countries, change has been less abrupt, more gradual or 
linked to country-specific drivers (such as labour law reform projects of national governments). 
From a longer-term perspective, it should also not be forgotten that in central and eastern Europe, 
the accession to the EU after 2003 – and even in the earlier phases of the transition from a central 
planning economy – has had the most significant impact on industrial relations.
Against this, the mapping of changes and their impact on industrial relations typologies in this 
study differs from the various studies that have analysed this question in relation to the effects of 
the 2008 crisis. Although the exact assessment may vary from case to case, what is striking when 
comparing the character of changes to different industrial relations typologies and country clusters 
is the polarisation and strong diversity within the different industrial relations models. In particular, 
the internal diversity in the Centre-East group is remarkable, ranging from quite stable situations to 
strong impacts.
Three general patterns of changes took place since the end of the 1990s that affected the five 
industrial relations clusters quite differently:
1. gradual adjustment, which characterises all countries in the North group and most countries in 
the Centre-West group (apart from Germany), as well as the majority of countries in the South 
and Centre-East groups;
2. accelerated change, which characterises a much smaller group of countries consisting of Germany 
as well as three Centre-East countries;
3. crisis-induced change, which affected countries in the West, South and Centre-East groups that 
were most severely hit by the crisis.
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In the third group, the future will tell whether or not the quite abrupt change may result in a ‘path 
break’, in other words, a shift away from certain industrial relations features (for example, the strong 
supporting and stabilising role of the state in the South model in regard to collective bargaining 
outcomes at national and sector levels by extension mechanisms) toward another model (namely 
a stronger market liberalism).
Unilateralism and shift in political paradigms
Although there are large differences in the extent and orientation of interventions in collective 
bargaining, the shift towards governmental unilateralism marks a major change, and not only in 
the crisis countries. The outputs from the European Semester process addressed to some Member 
States have caused a shift away from non-intervention in collective bargaining towards a more 
proactive EU stance. This new approach is one of guiding and recommending reforms that strengthen 
decentralised and more company-level flexibility (and limit practices of extension and thus collective 
bargaining coverage), while at the same time supporting social dialogue and social partnership as 
core elements of the European social model.22
This shift in political paradigms should not be underestimated nor should it be assumed that its 
effects are limited to the crisis-ridden ‘programme’ countries. Apart from more open intervention in 
favour of flexibilisation and decentralisation of collective bargaining, the absence of any significant 
initiative to support collective bargaining, tripartism or social dialogue with a view to their capacity 
to influence employment and social developments positively has and will have a strong impact on 
the future role of collective bargaining in the EU. It is worthwhile to look back at EU-level debates 
and assessments that were made before the crisis and the emergence of new economic governance 
to illustrate how significant the more recent shift of EU policy in regard to industrial relations and 
collective bargaining has been.
In 2002, a high-level group of experts commissioned by the European Commission highlighted 
the challenges that the EU’s economic and social fabric faces, mainly from globalisation. While 
acknowledging that this also puts stress on the industrial relations system, the group’s report 
emphasised the role of collective bargaining in developing adequate responses and, resulting from 
this, the need to actively support the social partners in the development of their capacities in this 
regard:
Enhancing competitiveness while preserving the European social model becomes 
a crucial issue for the EU in the global market place … Social partners should be 
assisted to develop their full capacity to meet the double challenge they face which, 
on the one hand, is to play their domestic roles effectively and on the other hand to 
prepare for their new obligations in the new Europe. Considerable development of the 
social partners is necessary to ensure that industrial relations function effectively at 
both European and national levels
(European Commission, 2002b, pp. 11, 31)
22 A  report published by the European Commission on labour market developments in 2012 includes a  ‘barometer’ or checklist of 
employment-friendly reforms that uses ‘decrease the bargaining coverage (for example, by revising the modalities and conditions for the 
extension of collective agreements to non-signatory parties)’ or ‘decentralise the bargaining system (for example, by introducing/extending 
the possibility to derogate from higher-level agreements or to negotiate firm-level agreements)’ as an indicator to measure the direction of 
labour market reforms and their ‘employment friendliness’ (European Commission, 2012, pp. v and 103–104). 
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Three years later a comparative report about collective bargaining trends during the 1990s published 
by Eurofound stated:
Since strong autonomous relations between social partners’ organisations are widely 
regarded as a core element of the ‘European social model’, there needs to be a growing 
responsibility to maintain or rebuild comprehensive collective bargaining systems for 
all relevant political actors, not only at national but also at European level
(Eurofound, 2005a, p. 25)
This study has shown that since the end of the 1990s national governments have played such 
a supportive role in a only few countries – in most countries, as well as at EU level particularly after 
2008, the opposite was more the case.
The need to find a new balance
This study has shown that, with few exceptions, most EU countries since the late 1990s have been 
reporting accelerated change in their collective bargaining practices and systems.
All EU countries have faced globalisation and increased pressure on costs and productivity; 
continuous economic and financial uncertainties; an unprecedented level of unemployment; 
technological change; demographic, employment and social changes and risks; increasing income 
inequalities; skills gaps; and the need to adjust training systems. These challenges are changing the 
role of, the problems to be addressed by, and the actors involved in collective bargaining. As a result, 
existing regulations and standard collective agreements are being challenged by the combined 
pressures of flexible work organisation, costs, outsourcing and shareholder value, especially where 
regulations and agreements cover entire sectors or national economies in a standard way. This, in 
turn, has created pressure for organised as well as more disorganised and fragmented decentralisation 
in all EU countries, accompanied by major strains and a weakening of the regulatory power of 
employer organisations and trade unions at national level.
Taking account of all these developments and often contradictory trends (polarisation or asymmetric 
convergence in terms of more flexible procedures, but also divergence in terms of national dynamics 
and the effects of the crisis), along with changes in the regulatory influence and orientations of 
national governments and European institutions, the following questions in regard to the current 
and future role of collective bargaining arise, based on two approaches:
• Will collective bargaining at company level keep on reducing its core functions as a mechanism 
for setting wages and incomes within a corridor that is mainly determined by firm performance, 
competitiveness and productivity?
• Or will there also be above that level a wider dimension of collective bargaining in regard to social 
integration, equality, avoiding unfair competition, and influencing employment and working 
conditions as well as income and wealth distribution more broadly, and not only limited to 
employees covered directly by bargaining agreements?
This research suggests that the evolution of these narrow and wider dimensions of collective 
bargaining since the late 1990s has been characterised by a growing imbalance, to the detriment of 
the wider and more solidarity-oriented dimension. At the same time, it has become clear that there 
are still examples throughout Europe where this more normative role of collective bargaining is alive 
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and has even been revitalised in response to social and labour market challenges. Accordingly, it is 
acknowledged that collective bargaining provides a solid foundation for progress and growth in the 
EU Member States, not only by setting wages and working conditions as core functions, but also 
by supporting the reduction of income inequalities. In addition, it comprises an intangible asset for 
industrial relations, building up mutual trust between actors, easing the settlement of labour and 
industrial disputes, and contributing to the general macroeconomic development at national level 
and better company performance.
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Table A1: Employer organisations and trade union density since the late 1990s
Employer organisation density (%) Trade union density (%)
1997–1999 2011–2013 Trend 1997–1999 2011–2013 Trend
Austria 100 100 Stable 39.8 27.8 Decline 
Belgium 82 82 Stable 55.6 50.4 Decline
Bulgaria (‑‑‑) 55 ‑‑‑ 39.2 19.8 Decline (>50%)
Cyprus 60 62.5 Increase 70 49 Decline
Czech Republic ‑‑‑ 35% ‑‑‑ 36.9 17.3 Decline (>50%)
Denmark 58 65 Increase 75.6) 68.5 Decline
Estonia > 35 23.8 Decline  >20 8.1 Decline (>50%)
Germany > 60 < 60 Decline 27 18 Decline
Greece ‑‑‑ 43.7 ‑‑‑ 29.8 25.4 Decline
Finland ‑‑‑ 72.7 ‑‑‑ 79.4 69 Decline
France 74 75 Stable 8.4 7.9 Decline 
Hungary ‑‑‑ 40 ‑‑‑ 35.3 16.8 Decline (>50%)
Ireland ‑‑‑ 60 ‑‑‑ 45.2 36.1 Decline 
Italy > 62 58 Decline 36.2 35.2 Stable 
Latvia ‑‑‑ 35 ‑‑‑ >25 14.8 Decline 
Lithuania ‑‑‑ < 14 ‑‑‑ 30 10 ‑‑‑
Luxembourg 80 80 Stable 42.4 37.3 Decline 
Malta ‑‑‑ 60 ‑‑‑ 62.8 48.6 Decline
Netherlands 85 85 Stable 24.4 19 Decline 
Norway 55 65 Increase 55.5 54.6 Stable 
Poland ‑‑‑ 20 ‑‑‑ 20.5 14.1 Decline (>40%)
Portugal < 60 65 Increase 25.2 19.3 Decline
Romania > 80 < 60 Decline >45 32.8 Decline
Slovakia > 33 < 29 Decline 42 16.7 Decline (>40%)
Slovenia 100 55 Decline 44.1 24.4 Decline (>40%)
Spain 72 75 Increase 15.6 15.6 Stable
Sweden > 83 < 83 Decline 82 68 Decline
UK > 40 <35 Decline 31.9 27.1 Decline 
Source: ICTWSS 4.0, April 2013
Annex: Supplementary tables
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Table A2: Number of employer organisations and trade unions since the late 1990s
Number of employer organisations Number of union confederations
1997–1999 2011–2013 1997–1999 2011–2013
Austria 2 2 1 1
Belgium 3 3 3 3
Bulgaria 5 7 5 3
Cyprus 4 5 4 4
Czech Republic 3 4 3 4
Denmark 4 4 4 4
Estonia 3 3 2 3
Germany 4 4 3 3
Greece 3 3 2 2
Finland 4 3 3 3
France 4 4 8 7
Hungary 7 6 6 6
Ireland 5 5 1 1
Italy 10 10 7 7
Latvia ‑‑‑ 2 1 2
Lithuania 1 2 4 3
Luxembourg 8 1 7 4
Malta 4 3 2 3
Netherlands 2 1 3 3
Norway 4 4 4 4
Poland 2 5 2 3
Portugal 5 6 4 4
Romania 10 13 5 5
Slovakia 2 3 1 2
Slovenia 4 5 3 7
Spain 2 2 6 6
Sweden 6 4 3 3
UK 1 1 1 1
Note: green = increase, grey = stable, yellow = decline
Source: ICTWSS 4.0, April 2013
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Table A3: Tripartite agreements and pacts on topics other than wage setting
Patterns of development 
and influence Countries, topics, trends
Strong or fairly strong 
influence and no 
significant change over 
the whole period
Finland: Before 2008: important agreements on social security and working conditions, for example, on 
pensions, employment contracts, health and safety at work, family leave and unemployment benefits. 
Since 2008: agreements on ‘change security’, unemployment and pension schemes.
Luxembourg: Traditionally, the agreements of the Tripartite Coordination Committee play an important 
role in wage development, working time (flexibility) and other topics (such as conversion of blue and 
white collar contracts); more recent tripartite discussions focused on competitiveness and the fight 
against unemployment.
Netherlands: Tripartite agreements have some influence on issues such as pensions, dismissal law and 
flexible contracts.
Slovenia (only public sector): Far‑reaching agreement between government and public sector trade 
unions in 2007 after five years of negotiation. Further agreements in different public service sectors 
(including social services, electricity, railways and coal mining) were concluded in 2008.
Limited influence and 
no significant change 
since the late 1990s
Croatia: The Economic and Social Council (ESC), a tripartite body established in 1994, has fostered the 
exchange of information and dialogue between the social partners and the government. The ESC also 
has an impact on collective bargaining styles and outcomes.
Czech Republic: A number of tripartite agreements (by the Council for Social and Economic Agreement 
of the Czech Republic, RSHD ČR) have addressed the regulation of collective bargaining (for example, 
2005–2006 on extension mechanisms); in 2010, a tripartite agreement and recommendation on economic 
revitalisation measures was finalised (the social partners were not consulted on the 2009 national 
anti‑crisis plan).
Lithuania: The national‑level tripartite agreement on cooperation (2005) and the national agreement to 
combat the crisis (2009) – both had only minor influence on collective bargaining.
Norway: The agreement on inclusive working life, renewed 2008.
Influence varying since 
the late 1990s
Italy: Tripartite agreements or accords played a major role in the 1990s in social, employment and 
industrial relations issues, but during the 2000s and after there was a growth in governmental 
unilateralism; more recently, in a 2012 agreement, tripartism was revived.
Germany: Temporary and largely government‑driven initiatives such as the Alliance for Jobs (1998–2003) 
or, more recently, on skilled labour and further training (2014).
Portugal: Most tripartite agreements refer to public policies (pensions, vocational education and 
training, health and safety, for example, in 2001, 2006 and 2007). Apart from the labour law reform of 
2008, tripartite agreements had little impact on labour law and collective bargaining regulation. An 
agreement signed in 2012 referred to collective bargaining, but it had no concrete impact.
Influence decreasing 
since the late 1990s
Ireland: Until 2008, national tripartite social partner agreements had a strong influence on employment 
legislation and income tax policy; since then, the influence of tripartism has decreased significantly.
Poland: The Tripartite Commission and joint agreements had addressed issues such as managing 
restructuring (recommendations and guidelines) and the implementation of EU Directives; since 2008 
and governmental unilateralism, cross‑sectoral tripartism was suspended and the sector level became 
more important. Slovenia: Between 2003 and 2009, there were two major ‘social agreements’ that made 
recommendations for the general direction for economic and social development, including provisions 
on wage policy, employment, training, social dialogue, equal opportunities and collective bargaining 
coordination and decentralisation. No social agreement has been concluded since 2008.
Influence increasing
Estonia: Tripartite consultation took place in the context of the Employment Relations Reform Act 2008.
Latvia: Before 2008, there was no tripartite practice, but this changed during the 2008 crisis. In 2009, 
the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Latvia on harsh austerity measures (such as 
wage cuts, cuts in pensions and other social expenditures) was also signed by the social partners. In 2011, 
cross‑industry social partners and the Ministry of Finance signed an agreement on tax policy strategy.
Sweden: Tripartite dialogue has only taken place since 2011. In 2013, there was an initiative to create 
subsidised introductory jobs in the industrial sector for young people with no relevant work experience. 
The new jobs are limited to employers that are members of an employer organisation that has signed 
a collective agreement including provisions that deal with introductory jobs.
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
Collective bargaining in Europe in the 21st century
70
Table A4: Bipartite agreements on topics other than wage setting
Patterns of development 
and influence Countries, topics, trends
Strong or fairly strong 
influence and no significant 
change over the whole 
period
Belgium: Tradition of comprehensive cross‑industry agreement, covering various topics such as 
training, pension schemes, conversion of blue and white collar contracts (for example, in 2011).
France: National interprofessional agreements play an important role as the basis for legal changes in 
fields such as employment policy, working conditions, older workers and social security. The reform 
of collective bargaining has also been addressed by a bipartite agreement (July 2001). Since 2008, the 
focus has increased on competitiveness and employment (the agreement of January 2013).
Germany: Bipartite cross‑industry agreements played an important role, in particular the pacts on 
fostering and increasing the number of apprenticeships (since 2004, renewed until the end of 2014). 
Also multistakeholder strategies, for instance in the field of occupational health and safety (Joint 
German Occupational Safety and Health Strategy), since 2006 are important.
Italy: Strong influence on regulation of working conditions and collective bargaining practice, for 
example, the 2009 industrial relations reform, the 2014 agreement on the representativeness of 
trade unions, and the 2012 agreement on productivity and competitiveness.
Netherlands: Mirroring the national tripartite agreements on issues such as pensions, dismissal law 
and flexible contracts.
Spain: Bipartite agreements have been concluded on a number of issues. Those that particularly 
have an impact on collective bargaining are the agreements on lifelong learning (concluded 
between 1992 and 2004) and on extra‑juridical resolution of conflicts (1996, 2001, 2004 and 2012). 
Important also was the 2013 agreement on the ultra‑activity of collective agreements 2013 in 
response to the collective bargaining reform of 2012.
Limited influence and no 
significant change since 
the late 1990s
Czech Republic: Bipartite agreements exist but have a limited influence on collective bargaining. In 
2001, the social partners in the automotive industry concluded an agreement to support collective 
bargaining in companies and to moderate disputes at this level. In 2004, a cross‑sector agreement 
was concluded in support of collective bargaining processes at various levels. Since 2008, existing 
bipartite agreements are still in place and are applied with no changes.
Ireland: In the private sector, there is only a bipartite ‘protocol’ from 2010, setting very basic rules 
for conducting local bargaining.
Norway: Bipartite agreement that extended vacation rights and introduced more flexible working 
time regulations had some influence. More recently, agreements following collective bargaining 
outcomes (for example, on working conditions) had less influence.
Poland: Implementation of EU Directives (for example, on telework and stress) by bipartite 
guidelines. The 2009 anti‑crisis package (remaining in force for two years) also resulted from 
13 proposals agreed between the social partners.
Influence varying since 
the late 1990s
Finland: Various agreements and recommendations between peak‑level employer organisations 
and trade unions on matters such as general cooperation, redundancy protection, holiday pay and 
work‑related stress, which had some influence on collective bargaining. Since 2008, agreements 
have taken the form of recommendations only (for example, on gender equality) as well as stronger 
forms (the proposal for a reform of the pension system was concluded in September 2014).
Sweden: Bipartite Industry Agreement 2010 in response to the crisis in the labour market (involving 
a reduction of working hours to prevent layoffs).
Influence increasing or 
decreasing since the 
late 1990s
‑‑‑
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
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Table A5: Overview of quantitative changes
Trends in duration  
of agreements
Trends in the number  
of agreements
Trends in collective bargaining 
coverage
Austria Stable Slight increase (before 2008) Slight increase
Belgium Stable Decrease at higher level, increase at 
company level 
No change
Bulgaria Unstable, shortened since 2008 Increasing before and decreasing 
after 2008
Increase
Croatia Unstable, shortened since 2008
Lack of data, but tendency towards 
increase
Decrease
Cyprus Shortened since 2008 Overall decrease Decrease
Czech Republic Stable at company level, prolonged 
for higher level since 2008
Overall decrease
Overall increase, but more 
companies having a collective 
agreement
Denmark Overall prolonged No change Slight decrease since 2008
Estonia No data Decrease Decrease
Finland Overall prolonged Slight increase at sector and 
company levels
No change
France No significant changes Volatile at national level, increase at 
sector and company levels
Stable at cross‑sector and sector 
levels, probably increasing at 
company level
Germany Prolonged Some increase at sector level and 
stronger increase at company level 
Decrease
Greece No data No data Decrease
Hungary Unstable, prolonged after 2008 No data Decrease
Ireland
Unstable and great variety at 
company level
No data Gradual but steady decrease
Italy No overall change
Stable at national and sector levels, 
increase at company level
No change
Latvia No data Decrease Decrease
Lithuania Unstable, shortened since 2008 Overall no change, slight increase of 
sector level agreements
No change
Luxembourg
Overall stable, but tendency 
towards shorter agreements since 
2008
No data No change
Malta No change
Decrease since 2008 at company 
level
Decrease
Netherlands No change No change at sector level, increase 
at company level
No change
Norway No change No change Slight decrease
Poland No change Overall decrease (slower since 2008) Decrease
Portugal Shortened after 2008
Slow decrease at sector and 
company levels before 2008 and 
strong decrease at sector and 
company levels after 2008
Slight decrease before and strong 
decrease after 2008
Romania Change since 2011
Abrupt and sharp decrease since 
2011
Decrease between 1997 and 2009, 
increase in 2013
Slovakia No change Decrease at sector and company 
levels
No data 
Slovenia
Lack of data, but new regulation 
on unilateral termination likely to 
result in shorter durations 
Decrease (especially at sector level) No data
Spain
Prolonged after 2008
Increase at sector and company 
levels before 2008 and decrease 
since then 
Sharp decrease from around 80% to 
less than 60%
Sweden No change at national and company 
levels, shortened sector level
No change No change
UK
Prolonged before and shortened 
after 2008
Decrease No data
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
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Table A6: Main features and evolution of centralisation and decentralisation
Change pattern Countries and details
No significant 
change Croatia, Latvia, Norway, UK
Steady 
decentralisation
Austria: Steady decentralisation from sector to company level. More recently, tendencies of fragmentation and 
more uncoordinated decentralisation (for instance, the 2012 bargaining round in metalworking).
Belgium: Steady decentralisation from centralised to sector or branch level. Regionalisation also affected 
collective bargaining processes.
Finland: Steady increase of decentralisation from national to lower levels (opening clauses on a growing number 
of issues). More recent national agreements tend to have the nature of framework agreements for lower‑level 
bargaining.
France: Steady increase of decentralisation from national to lower levels (in particular, company level).
Luxembourg: Steady decentralisation from central to sector and company levels.
Netherlands: Steady increase of decentralisation, but in a highly coordinated way. 
Accelerated 
decentralisation
Bulgaria: Steady decentralisation from centralised to sector or branch level. Increased use of opening clauses.
Cyprus: Since 2012, an accelerating trend of decentralisation from sector to company level and also from 
company level to workplace or firm level by deviations from collective agreements, reflecting the situation of 
the firm.
Czech Republic: Decentralisation trend continues and has accelerated since 2008.
Denmark: Strong increase of decentralisation from sector to company level since 2008. Also further 
decentralisation from company to workplace level since 2008.
Germany: Accelerated trend of decentralisation from national to lower levels (including workplace level). In the 
public sector, decentralisation from national to local bargaining.
Italy: Since 2008, the trend of decentralisation from sector to company level as well as from company to 
workplace level has accelerated.
Malta: System is already highly decentralised, with the main bargaining level being the company level. Also, 
existing agreements with sectoral partners were not renewed (for example, for car import sector in 2004).
Poland: Accelerating trend from sector to company level. In both periods under analysis, a systematic decrease 
in the significance of sectoral collective bargaining was apparent as compared to enterprise‑level bargaining 
(indicating decentralisation of collective bargaining). Single‑employer collective agreements prevail because in 
many sectors there are no appropriate employer organisations (or, more rarely, sectoral trade unions structures), 
or sectoral organisations refuse to engage in bargaining with trade unions.
Slovakia: Accelerating trend of decentralisation from sector to company level (illustrated by a decreasing 
number of multiemployer collective agreements and a relatively stable number of company collective 
agreements).
Slovenia: The steady trend of decentralisation from sector to company level after 2008 was further accelerated 
by the shift from centralised to sector‑level bargaining in the public services sector.
Spain: The steady trend of decentralisation from sector to company level has been accelerated by the 2012 
reform that gave priority to company‑level agreements over sectoral multiemployer agreements (whether 
national, regional or provincial) in matters such as basic pay and pay supplements, even if the social partners 
decide to establish an alternative structure of collective bargaining.
Sweden: Steady trend of decentralisation that includes the delegation of wage setting from sector to local or 
company level.
Accelerated 
decentralisation 
with abrupt 
change
Greece: Apart from the steady acceleration of decentralisation from cross‑sector to sector or branch levels, the 
reforms since 2008 have resulted in an abrupt increase in decentralisation to company and workplace levels.
Hungary: Apart from the steady acceleration of decentralisation from cross‑sector to sector or branch levels, the 
reforms since 2008 have resulted in an abrupt increase in decentralisation to company and workplace levels.
Ireland: Apart from the longer‑term decentralisation trends, accelerated decentralisation took place after 2008 
with the abolition of national agreements and the end of sector‑level coordination and extension practice.
Portugal: Although there was no shift between bargaining levels, the reforms after 2008 have resulted in 
a collapse of branch‑level agreements and a strong drop in company‑level negotiations.
Romania: Little change before 2008 but abrupt change of the whole bargaining system due to the new 2011 
regulation (which included the abolition of national and branch sector agreements)
Tendencies of 
recentralisation
Estonia: The system is already strongly decentralised, with company level being the main bargaining level. There 
are tendencies (arising from social partners initiatives) towards recentralisation (from company to sector level).
Lithuania: As the company level is already the main level of collective bargaining, the system throughout 
the period remained very decentralised. In 2012–2014, attempts were made to encourage the agreement of 
higher‑level bargaining at sector level (in order to provide general frameworks, supported by ESF funding).
Source: Authors, based on contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents
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Table A7: Measuring the intensity of change in collective bargaining since 1997
  Factors influencing collective bargaining Outcomes  
 
Union 
member‑
ship
Employer 
organisa‑
tion mem‑
bership
Regula‑
tory 
change: 
extension
Regula‑
tory 
change: 
deviation
Coordi‑
nation
Bargain‑
ing cov‑
erage
Decentral‑
isation
Coordi‑
nation
Bargain‑
ing 
agenda
Overall 
change
Latvia 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 11
Overall 
Stability
Belgium 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 11
Luxembourg 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 11
Netherlands 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 11
Norway 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 11
Austria 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 12
UK 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 13
Malta 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 14
Steady 
change
Denmark 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 14
Lithuania 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 14
Bulgaria 3 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 15
Czech  
Republic
3 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 15
Finland 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 15
France 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 15
Sweden 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 15
Poland 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 16
Cyprus 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 16
Estonia 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 16
Italy 1 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 16
Hungary 3 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 17
Sig‑
nificant 
Change
Spain 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 17
Portugal 2 2 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 18
Slovakia 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 18
Slovenia 3 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 19
Ireland 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 20
Germany 3 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 20
Greece 2 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 22
Romania 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 22
Note: 1 = no or very little change, 2 = gradual change, 3 = significant change.
Source: Authors, based contributions from Eurofound’s network of correspondents and other sources.
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